A Defence of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics

Algander, Per

doi:10.1007/s11158-011-9164-0

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Like Gert (2003), we can distinguish the ‘justifying strength’ from the ‘requiring strength’ of reasons: the reasons to confer existential benefits may have justifying strength but no requiring strength. Or perhaps there are two different types of reasons, rather than two different strengths: Algander (2012), in this very context, distinguishes ‘favouring’ from ‘requiring’ reasons. Finally, in the terminology of McMahan (2013), perhaps existential benefits have ‘cancelling weight’ (or in McMahan (2015), ‘offsetting weight') but no ‘reason‐giving weight’.…”

Section: Towards a Theory Of The Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term

Thomas

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

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The asymmetry is the view in population ethics that, while we ought to avoid creating additional bad lives, there is no requirement to create additional good ones. The question is how to embed this intuitively compelling view in a more complete normative theory, and in particular one that treats uncertainty in a plausible way. While arguing against existing approaches, I present new and general principles for thinking about welfarist choice under uncertainty. Together, these reduce arbitrary choices to uncertainty‐free ones, regardless of how the latter should be made. I illustrate these principles by developing two theories of the asymmetry, reflecting different views about the non‐identity problem. In doing so, I clarify some other major choice‐points, presenting new arguments that creating additional good lives can justify (but not require) doing harm. Finally, I consider what the developed theories have to say about the importance of extinction risk and the long‐run future.

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Section: Towards a Theory Of The Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term

Thomas

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Contrastive evidence is particularly important because the asymmetry intuition itself is not universally shared. Instead, some find the reason claim intuitive: there is a reason to create a happy life just because it would be happy (Chappell 2017;Rüger 2020; see also Algander 2012). 6 Various proponents of the procreation asymmetry explicitly acknowledge the lack of contrastive evidence (see e.g.…”

Section: The Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

The Procreation Asymmetry Destabilized: Analogs and Acting for People's Sake

Aaron¹

2022

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Is there a pro tanto moral reason to create a life merely because it would be good for the person living it? Proponents of the procreation asymmetry claim there is not. Defending this controversial no reason claim, some have suggested that it is well in line with other phenomena in the moral realm: there is no reason to give a promise merely because one would keep it, and there is no reason to procreate merely to increase the extent of justice in the world. Allegedly, some analogs extend so far as to support a unified theory of the no reason claim and the nonidentity thesis, that is, the view that of two persons leading lives of positive wellbeing, there is a reason to create the person with higher wellbeing. I dismantle the proposed analogs and show that they fail to meet various desiderata. Moreover, I refute Johann Frick's argument that the no reason claim follows from the assumption that reasons of beneficence are reasons to act for the sake of people. By criticizing attractive defenses for the no reason claim, I weaken its plausibility.

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“…The difference in most people's intuitions towards bringing into existence happy and unhappy lives has sometimes been known in the literature in reproductive and population ethics as "the asymmetry" (Persson 2009, Roberts 2011, Algander 2012, Frick 2014, Grill 2017). However, this term has been utilized with a different meaning as well, that is, to name the view that what makes lives valuable does not count exactly as much as what makes lives disvaluable.…”

Section: Symmetry and Asymmetry Between Positive And Negative Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

Two asymmetries in population and general normative ethics

Rozas

2021

Etikk Praksis - Nord J Appl Ethics

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This paper examines a dilemma in reproductive and population ethics that can illuminate broader questions in axiology and normative ethics. This dilemma emerges because most people have conflicting intuitions concerning whether the interests of non-existent beings can outweigh the interests of existing beings when those merely potential beings are expected to have overall net-good or overall net-bad lives. The paper claims that the standard approach to this issue, in terms of exemplifying the conflict between Narrow Person-Affecting Views and Impersonal Views, is not correct. It argues that, instead, we can approach the issue through the distinction between Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Views about the relative importance of positive and negative value. The paper also claims that Asymmetrical Views provide the most intuitively satisfactory solution to the dilemma and can in addition be defended independently on further grounds. Keywords: person-affecting views, impersonal views, symmetry, asymmetry

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A Defence of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics

Cited by 7 publications

References 14 publications

The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term

The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term

The Procreation Asymmetry Destabilized: Analogs and Acting for People's Sake

Two asymmetries in population and general normative ethics

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