A Decision Theoretic Foundation for Noise Traders and Correlated Speculation

Abstract

Noise traders are a central idea in the modern theory of asset markets, yet there is not a standard model of such agents in contrast to the well-established representation of rational agents as expected utility maximizers. We propose the Hurwicz criterion, a classical criterion in decision analysis for choice under uncertainty, as a foundation for noise traders in asset markets. Hurwicz agents trade on optimism and pessimism and do not trade on information. A binary asset market is introduced with asymmetric information and heterogeneity both in rationality and in ambiguity attitudes. In this environment, noise trader behavior is endogenously positively correlated, the market is more efficient in low sentiment periods, and the favorite-longshot bias holds in equilibrium. The analysis demonstrates that aggregate market properties such as positive trading volume and the favorite longshot bias can be derived from the micro behavior of individual agents that have an axiomatic foundation.