A Day in the Life of an Icelandic Banker

Abstract

The late twentieth century is widely heralded as the time that proved the inadequacies of communism and socialism and the triumph of the free market. Free trade interlinking an increasingly globalized economy would make war among nations unthinkable. Resources that previously supported governments were freed for private use. The liberated and self-regulating market would insure efficiencies unknown to centralized planners, remove the need for most regulations, and usher in an age of unknown plenty and prosperity for all. The foundation of the successful free market would be the unfettered individual. This ideology, known as "neoliberalism," would have tragic consequences for millions as its proponents such as the Chicago School economists and their political allies implemented its tenets around the world (Klein 2007; Mirowski 2014). Iceland was not immune. Icelandic economists, ideologues, and politicians enacted their own version of neoliberalism centered on the instantaneous creation of wealth through the privatization of the resources of the sea-fish (Bergmann 2014). As it had done around the world, neoliberalism eventually concentrated wealth in

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“…For a great majority of Iceland's population, the realisation of the country's impending economic collapse happened at this moment. The shock and surprise of this realisation is probably best reflected in that many of those working in the collapsing banks were also equally surprised that the country was collapsing economically (Mixa ). Between 33% and 60% of non‐financial firms became ‘technically bankrupt’; in addition various industries that had benefitted from borrowed money ‘became obsolete overnight’ (Danielsson and Zoega : 16).…”