A Cyber-Security Methodology for a Cyber-Physical Industrial Control System Testbed

Abstract

Due to recent increase in deployment of Cyber-Physical Industrial Control Systems in different critical infrastructures, addressing cyber-security challenges of these systems is vital for assuring their reliability and secure operation in presence of malicious cyber attacks. Towards this end, developing a testbed to generate real-time data-sets for critical infrastructure that would be utilized for validation of realtime attack detection algorithms are indeed highly needed. This paper investigates and proposes the design and implementation of a cyber-physical industrial control system testbed where the Tennessee Eastman process is simulated in real-time on a PC and the closed-loop controllers are implemented on the Siemens PLCs. False data injection cyber attacks are injected to the developed testbed through the man-in-the-middle structure where the malicious hackers can in real-time modify the sensor measurements that are sent to the PLCs. Furthermore, various cyber attack detection algorithms are developed and implemented in real-time on the testbed and their performance and capabilities are compared and evaluated. INDEX TERMS Industrial Control Systems, Cyber Attack, Attack Detection Algorithm, Man-in-themiddle Attack, Hybrid Testbed.

Investigating the Cybersecurity of Smart Grids Based on Cyber-Physical Twin Approach

“…The work by Noorizadeh et al [15] presents a hybrid testbed for industrial control systems implemented by realtime simulation of the Tennessee-Eastman process as the physical component of the testbed is combined with emulation of field devices. In their work, they address the challenge of obtaining hard-to-access field data by generating and logging the data from the physical part of the proposed testbed.…”

Practical Evaluation of Poisoning Attacks on Online Anomaly Detectors in Industrial Control Systems

“…It has been used as a base for several cybersecurity testbeds such as the NIST's cybersecurity performance testbed [7], Damn Vulnerable Chemical Process [31], and GRFICS [13]. Consequently, many recent cyberattack and anomaly detection studies [26,14,35,21,41] use TE as a test case.…”

“…The process can operate in six different modes that reflect the desired values of the ∕ ratio as well as of the production rate; we used the base case -Mode 1. The process has 41 measurements, XMEAS(1) through XMEAS (41), and 12 manipulated variables, XMV(1) through XMV (12). For example, XMEAS(1) measures the feed of component A, and XMV(3) allows controlling this feed by manipulating the corresponding valve.…”

Investigating Man-in-the-Middle-based False Data Injection in a Smart Grid Laboratory Environment

“…In addition, studies have been conducted on synthesis frameworks for specific attack vectors [23] as well as on an automated marking process for deployed protocol-specific attack [13]. In this context, research on stealthy MITM attacks for FDI in DNP3 or Profinet is also conducted in a cyber-physical test environment to analyze the impact on latency [24] or generate datasets for datadriven detection approaches [25]. Many of the related works involve the study of cyber-attacks on power grids for data generation and consequence analysis.…”