A Cultural Theory of Partisanship and Policy Attitudes

Abstract

Objective Political parties provide an important function for a public that is generally seen as not consistently ideological by guiding its thinking about policy issues. In this article, we examine whether the four cultural worldviews derived from grid‐group cultural theory—hierarch, egalitarian, individualist, and fatalist—are predictive of partisan attachments and perceptions of climate change risk among the public. Methods Data come from an original survey of the U.S. public conducted in 2011 and 2012. We use regression analysis to examine partisanship and perceived climate change risk; ordered logit to examine party attachment; and mediation analysis to examine the mediating effect of partisanship on cultural worldviews and climate change risk. Results We find that the group‐oriented cultural types (egalitarians and hierarchs) are more likely to have stronger party attachments than the nongroup‐oriented cultural types (individualists and fatalists). In addition, we find that the mediation effect of party is more pronounced among the group‐oriented types than the nongroup oriented. Conclusion Grid‐group cultural theory is predictive of both partisanship and policy attitudes and partisanship mediates the influence of cultural worldviews on climate change risk, particularly for those types with group orientations.

Construct Validity of Cultural Theory Survey Measures

“…For social scientists studying public opinion and such topics as political culture, the culture wars, ideology, value structure, mass belief systems, partisanship, political sophistication, political participation, policy preferences, risk perceptions, and many other subjects, CT provides rich theoretical resources. Its operationalization in survey research provides fresh insights and often greater explanatory and predictive power than alternative theories and concepts, including left–right ideology and partisanship (see, e.g., Ellis and Thompson, 1997; Gastil et al., 2011; Grendstad, 2000, 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Grendstad and Selle, 1997, 1999; Herron and Jenkins‐Smith, 2006; Jackson, 2014; Johnson and Swedlow, 2019b; Johnson, Swedlow, and Mayorga, 2019; Jones, 2011; Kahan et al., 2010a, 2010b; Kiss, Lachapelle, and Montpetit, 2020; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin, 2014; Maleki and Hendriks, 2015; Nowlin and Rabovsky, 2019; Olli, 2012; Ripberger, Jenkins‐Smith, and Herron, 2011; Ripberger et al., 2012, 2014; Swedlow et al., 2016a; Trousset et al., 2015; Wildavksy and Dake, 1990; Xue et al, 2014). However, with the exception of predictive validity (focusing mostly on effect sizes) (Kahan, 2012; Marris et al., 1998; Rippl, 2002; Sjoeberg, 1998, 2003, 2005a, 2005b), the construct validity of the survey measures used in these studies has not begun to be assessed until recently (Cambardella et al., 2020; Johnson and Swedlow, 2019a, 2019b; Johnson, Swedlow, and Mayorga, 2019; Swedlow et al., 2016b; Xue et al., 2014, 2016).…”

“…and Mayorga, 2019;Jones, 2011;Kahan et al, 2010aKahan et al, , 2010bKiss, Lachapelle, and Montpetit, 2020;Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin, 2014;Maleki and Hendriks, 2015;Nowlin and Rabovsky, 2019;Olli, 2012;Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith, and Herron, 2011;Ripberger et al, 2012Ripberger et al, , 2014Swedlow et al, 2016a;Trousset et al, 2015;Wildavksy and Dake, 1990;Xue et al, 2014). However, with the exception of predictive validity (focusing mostly on effect sizes) (Kahan, 2012;Marris et al, 1998;Rippl, 2002;Sjoeberg, 1998Sjoeberg, , 2003Sjoeberg, , 2005aSjoeberg, , 2005b, the construct validity of the survey measures used in these studies has not begun to be assessed until recently (Cambardella et al, 2020;Swedlow, 2019a, 2019b;Johnson, Swedlow, and Mayorga, 2019;Swedlow et al, 2016b;Xue et al, 2014Xue et al, , 2016.…”

Policy Learning and Information Processing

“…Policy core beliefs are applicable to a subsystem and are informed by deep core beliefs. For example, an egalitarian worldview as a deep core belief informs the policy core belief that climate change poses significant risks (Jones, 2011; Nowlin & Rabovsky, 2020). Finally, secondary beliefs are constrained by both deep core and policy core beliefs and are focused on a set of narrow concerns within a policy domain (e.g., levels of budget authority).…”

Who should “do more” about climate change? Cultural theory, polycentricity, and public support for climate change actions across actors and governments

“…Hierarchs prefer social arraignments with clear lines of authority within clearly defined groups, and their views on climate change tend to be muddled and associated with their political beliefs. Specifically, Nowlin and Rabovsky (2020) found that, on average, increasing hierarchical beliefs was not associated with perceived risk from climate change; however, liberal hierarchs perceived increasing risk from climate change, whereas conservative hierarchs perceived less risk from climate change. Additionally, work using cultural cognition theory pairs hierarchy with individualism and finds that hierarch‐individualists tend not to perceive climate change as a risk (Kahan et al, 2012; Nowlin, 2019).…”

“…Cultural theory is based on ideal social relationships within societies, which makes it a useful framework for examining which actors and institutions the public thinks should be doing more to address the climate crisis. Additionally, views on climate change are highly polarized across cultural types, particularly between egalitarians and individualists (Jones, 2011; Kahan et al, 2012; Nowlin & Rabovsky, 2020).…”