A Cross-Cutting Calm

Mason, Lilliana

doi:10.1093/poq/nfw001

Cited by 270 publications

(114 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…We recruited subjects from Amazon's Mechanical Turk, a survey platform whose subjects are known to fall short of demographically-representing the wider US population (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016). As highlighted in the introduction, Mason (2016Mason ( , 2018 finds that US party identity is increasingly in alignment with demographic identities (e.g., race, religiosity), and, importantly, that this alignment may serve to weaken barriers to out-party hostility (Mason & Wronski, 2018;Roccas & Brewer, 2002). For this reason, insofar as our subjects did not faithfully represent the demographic identities of the wider US population, it is possible that our analyses mis-estimated the population-level association between moral polarization and out-party hostility in IPD-MD.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral polarization and out-party hostility in the US political context

Tappin

McKay

2019

J. Soc. Polit. Psych.

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Affective polarization describes the phenomenon whereby people identifying as Republican or Democrat tend to view opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans positively. Though extensively studied, there remain important gaps in scholarly understanding of affective polarization. In particular, (a) how it relates to the distinct behavioural phenomena of in-party “love” vs. out-party hostility; and (b) to what extent it reflects a generalized evaluative disparity between partisans vs. a domain-specific disparity in evaluation. We report the results of an investigation that bears on both of these questions. Specifically, drawing on recent trends in political science and psychology, we hypothesize that moral polarization—the tendency to view opposing partisans’ moral character negatively, and co-partisans’ moral character positively—will be associated with behavioural hostility towards the out-party. We test this hypothesis in two preregistered studies comprising behavioural measures and large convenience samples of US partisans (combined N = 1354). Our results strike an optimistic chord: Taken together, they suggest that this association is probably small and somewhat tenuous. Though moral polarization itself was large—perhaps exceeding prior estimates of trait affective polarization—even the most morally polarized partisans appeared reluctant to engage in a mild form of out-party hostility. These findings converge with recent evidence that polarization—moral or otherwise—has yet to translate into the average US partisan wanting to express hostile and directly discriminatory behaviour toward their out-party counterparts.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral polarization and out-party hostility in the US political context

Tappin

McKay

2019

J. Soc. Polit. Psych.

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“…Not only do liberals today overwhelmingly identify as Democrats, and conservatives as Republicans (Levendusky, 2009), but these identities have also become increasingly homogenous in terms of race, geography, and religion (Mason, 2018b). Social identity theory posits that the convergence and overlapping of social, ideological and party identities (political 'sorting') eliminates the ability of identities to 'cross-cut' each other and therefore create a more complex and inclusive identity structure (Brewer, 1999;Mason, 2016;Roccas & Brewer, 2002).…”

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confidence: 99%

The individual and the nation: A qualitative analysis of US liberal and conservative identity content

Hanson

O’Dwyer

Lyons

2019

J. Soc. Polit. Psych.

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Recent research highlights the significant role of political ideological identities in America’s increasing political polarisation. In line with social identity theory, self-placement as a US liberal or conservative predicts favouritism toward the ideological in-group and negative attitudes and behaviours toward the outgroup. The theory also holds that the link between self-categorisation and behaviour is mediated by the content of that identity, by what an individual believes it means to be a member of that group. Although previous research has done much to analyse the differences between US liberals and conservatives on various a priori dimensions, little work has been aimed at gaining a holistic account of ideological identity content from the individual’s lay perspective. Through qualitative analysis of 40 interviews (20 liberals and 20 conservatives), this study identifies central themes in the meaning self-identified US liberals and conservatives attribute to these labels and finds evidence for asymmetrical constructions of these identities. The liberal participant group’s identity construction revolved around identification as, and concern for, individuals, supported by reference to personal values and political issues and underpinned by a motivation to move toward a more equal society. Conversely, the conservative participant group connected the understanding of their identity directly to the political ideology of the nation through a thread of self-reliance and reverence for the national group. Implications for political behaviour and the study of ideological identity are discussed.

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“…other policy or identity variables (Franklin and Jackson, 1983), potentially because party serves as a group identity (Iyengar et al, 2012). However, other research suggests that social sorting, or the linkage between partisan identities and other social group identities (e.g., religious or racial groups), underlies much of this type of polarization (Mason, 2016) -and thus it is critical to consider partisanship alongside other identities in the same model. In our reporting of statistics from these models, we use (2016) to indicate results from the presidential election data and (2018) to indicate results from the midterm election data.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, voters increasingly mistrust candidates from the opposing party (Lelkes et al, 2017), express negative stereotypes of those with a different political affiliation (Iyengar et al, 2012), and exhibit partisan animus in job evaluations (Gift and Gift, 2015) and dating behavior (Huber and Malhotra, 2017). This affective polarization may arise from social sorting, such that social group identities increasingly align with party affiliations (Mason, 2016). Following previous political science work (Mason, 2016), by "social group identities" we mean identities that are not based in partisanship, 1 reflective of other personal identifications.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This affective polarization may arise from social sorting, such that social group identities increasingly align with party affiliations (Mason, 2016). Following previous political science work (Mason, 2016), by "social group identities" we mean identities that are not based in partisanship, 1 reflective of other personal identifications. While distinct, social group identities and partisan identities are becoming increasingly correlated.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Voter Preferences Reflect a Competition Between Policy and Identity

Jenke

Huettel

2020

Front. Psychol.

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Canonical rational choice models of voter preferences assume that voters select candidates whose policy positions most closely match their own. Yet, much of the electorate often appears to prioritize identity variables (e.g., social categories, group membership) over policy considerations. Here, we report an empirical test of policyidentity interactions using surveys of likely voters conducted in the 24 hours before the 2016 United States presidential election and the 2018 United States senatorial elections. Each respondent indicated not only their policy preferences but also key social group identities and how those identities would be reinforced by voting. We observed striking evidence for a competition between policy and social group identification: For voters who exhibited the maximal effects of identity, policy positions were essentially irrelevant to their candidate preferences. These results account for dissociations between voters' stated policy preferences and their voting behavior, while linking empirical observations of political behavior to new models derived from psychology and neuroscience.

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A Cross-Cutting Calm

Cited by 270 publications

References 29 publications

Moral polarization and out-party hostility in the US political context

Moral polarization and out-party hostility in the US political context

The individual and the nation: A qualitative analysis of US liberal and conservative identity content

Voter Preferences Reflect a Competition Between Policy and Identity

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