A Critical Overview of Biological Functions

Garson, Justin

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-32020-5

Cited by 120 publications

(60 citation statements)

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“…In this scenario, an entity that is either created or modified by mutation undergoes positive selection, and through several rounds of mutation and positive selection it is molded to perform its current role. Philosophers of biology often treat selected effect (SE) functions as if all were adaptations, the underlying traits and the genes encoding them once having increased (and possibly still increasing) in frequency in the relevant population due to "positive" or "directional" selection [13,14]. Biologists too, often do this, focusing on complex adaptations that have undergone improvement in performance as a result of many successive rounds of variation and positive selection.…”

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confidence: 99%

Getting clear about the F-word in genomics

2020

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confidence: 99%

Getting clear about the F-word in genomics

2020

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“…On this pluralistic view, the many different analyses of the function predicate that have been proposed by philosophers may all have their applications in different biological disciplines. For example, the etiological analysis of function (Neander 1991;Millikan 1989;Griffiths 1993;Godfrey Smith 1994;Garson 2016) For any function predicate F: <X, G, S, ϕ> : F is satisfied iff S's having G depends on X's ϕ-ing.…”

Section: On the Core Meaning Of Function Predicatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How objective are biological functions?

Weber

2017

Synthese

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John Searle has argued that functions owe their existence to the value that we put into life and survival. In this paper, I will provide a critique of Searle's argument concerning the ontology of functions. I rely on a standard analysis of functional predicates as relating not only a biological entity (e.g., the heart), an activity that constitutes the function of this entity (e.g., pumping blood) and a type of system but also a goal state (e.g., survival or evolutionary fitness). A functional attribution without specification of such a goal state has no truth-value.But if completed with a goal state, functional attributions understood as four-place relations attain a truth-value. The truth conditions of all attributions of function involve a dependence claim of the goal state on the function bearer's activity. The nature of this dependence may differ; I consider five different possibilities: causality, mechanistic constitution, mereology, supervenience and metaphysical grounding. If these dependency relations are objective, Searle's central ontological thesis fails. What he ought to have said is that our valuing survival or other goal states may be the reason why biology seeks functional knowledge, but this has nothing to do with ontology. I will show further that Searle also raised an interesting challenge concerning the relationship of functional and causal truths, but it does not threaten the objectivity of functions either. At best, it could show that functional vocabulary is eliminable.However, I will show that functional vocabulary is not so eliminable.

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“…Por supuesto, ha existido una enorme controversia acerca de cómo deba ser comprendida la naturaleza de una 'función' en Biología, especialmente si se las pretende reducir a una perspectiva general naturalista (cf. para un panorama general, Garson, 2016). Bajo ninguna de las alternativas que han sido discutidas para comprender una 'función biológica', sin embargo, pareciera que la frecuencia de perturbaciones ecológicas pueda contar como un 'mecanismo' dotado de una 'función'.…”

Section: Una Objeciónunclassified

Condiciones de identidad para organismos

Alvarado

Unwin

2017

Principia

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In this work it is proposed that the conditions of identity for biological organisms are given by the following principle: for all organisms x and y, x = y if and only if x has been caused by the self-preserving activity of y. This principle determines both the inter-temporal identity of organisms and the identity of organism in different possible worlds. It unifies what can be supposed about conditions of identity coming from —at least— three different conceptions about the nature of biological organisms, those of RobertWilson, Thomas Pradeu and Ellen Clarke. These conceptions are presented and compared.

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A Critical Overview of Biological Functions

Cited by 120 publications

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Getting clear about the F-word in genomics

Getting clear about the F-word in genomics

How objective are biological functions?

Condiciones de identidad para organismos

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