A Critical Appraisal of Karl Olivecrona's Legal Philosophy

Kelsen’s Metaethics

“…Kelsen emphasizes, however, that although one may presuppose the basic norm, one does not have to, which is to say that although one may conceive of law as a system of valid norms, one does not have to. For example, Karl Olivecrona (1939) argues that there is no such thing as binding force (or normativity), and that law is best understood as a set of independent imperatives, whose function is not to confer rights and impose duties, but to cause the subjects of law to behave in certain ways (on this, see Spaak 2014, chaps 7–8). On Kelsen’s analysis, then, the validity of law is conditional upon the presupposition of the basic norm, or, alternatively, as Joseph Raz (2009c [1979], 303–8) proposes, is seen from the point of view of the person presupposing the basic norm; and, as we have just seen, the presupposition of the basic norm in turn is conditional upon the wish of the person making the presupposition to conceive of law as a system of valid norms.…”

Scandinavian Legal Realism and the Challenge of Recognizing Emergency Medical Service as a Legal Norm

“…A preference for security and a fear of the unknown can restrain individuals from the challenging legislation (Schmidt, 1978, pp. 16-18;Spaak, 2014). However, because norms do not have a reality of their own but are constructed in the minds of individuals to reflect the feelings of society, it follows that in order for a norm to have legal validity, it must correspond with what is perceived as fair and just by the public (Jorgensen, 1984, p. 5;Carty, 2003, p. 826;Pattero, 2009, pp.…”

Schauer's Anti‐Essentialism

“…He does, however, add in his later writings (ix) that the coercive power of the state presupposes that the state also has psychological power, and vice versa, and (x) that only judicial independence and a sound judicial ethics can guarantee legal certainty. (For more on Olivecrona on coercion, see Spaak , chap. 10)…”