A Cost‐Benefit Analysis of Alternative Device Configurations for Aviation‐Checked Baggage Security Screening

Abstract

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have resulted in dramatic changes in aviation security. As of early 2003, an estimated 1,100 explosive detection systems (EDS) and 6,000 explosive trace detection machines (ETD) have been deployed to ensure 100% checked baggage screening at all commercial airports throughout the United States. The prohibitive costs associated with deploying and operating such devices is a serious issue for the Transportation Security Administration. This article evaluates the cost effectiveness of the explosive detection technologies currently deployed to screen checked baggage as well as new technologies that could be used in the future. Both single-device and two-device systems are considered. In particular, the expected annual direct cost of using these devices for 100% checked baggage screening under various scenarios is obtained and the tradeoffs between using single- and two-device strategies are studied. The expected number of successful threats under the different checked baggage screening scenarios with 100% checked baggage screening is also obtained. Lastly, a risk-based screening strategy proposed in the literature is analyzed. The results reported suggest that for the existing security setup, with current device costs and probability parameters, single-device systems are less costly and have fewer expected number of successful threats than two-device systems due to the way the second device affects the alarm or clear decision. The risk-based approach is found to have the potential to significantly improve security. The cost model introduced provides an effective tool for the execution of cost-benefit analyses of alternative device configurations for aviation-checked baggage security screening.

Optimal Allocation of Resources in Airport Security: Profiling vs. Screening

“…Then there is also a third dimension in the screening literature that examines methods of optimally screening baggage (see for example, Jacobson et al, 2005 and2006). In a related context, Nie (2011) and Jacobson et al (2006) study the configuration of devices that would be optimal for minimizing the total cost of screening. Bier and Haphuriwat (2011) analyze the problem of optimal screening in the context of port security.…”

“…If the government wants to screen i, then it has to incur a cost of c. Thus, c is the constant marginal cost of screening. We assume that c > 0 following extant literature (some examples include: Jacobson et al (2006) and Cavosgulu, Koh and Ragunathan (2010)). Next, let L (b i ) denote the damage if i attacks successfully.…”

Sensor Management Problems of Nuclear Detection

“…Their approach defines a framework for determining alarms when there are limited screening resources. Jacobson et al [JKK06] look at baggage screening at airports and compare 100% screening with one type of screening device with screening with a second device when the first device says a bag is suspicious. They calculate costs and benefits of the two methods.…”

Scenario Analysis, Decision Trees and Simulation for Cost Benefit Analysis of the Cargo Screening Process

“…The authors support their choice of methodology with previous research using the same research strategy. Jacobson et al (2006) suggest the cost benefit analysis in evaluation of cost effectiveness while screening 100% of the cargo and using single or double devices. The authors propose a model to measure costs versus benefits while using different configurations of explosive detection systems and explosive trace detection machines in US airports.…”