A cosmopolitan legal order: Constitutional pluralism and rights adjudication in Europe

Sweet, Alec Stone

doi:10.1017/s2045381711000062

Cited by 61 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…While such a human rights court at the global level may seem a very distant institutional aim, a similar court has of course been a reality for some time at the suprastate regional level, in the European Court of Human Rights. The Court, which as noted has become more firmly enmeshed in European Union governance under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, has provided an important mechanism of direct challenge for individuals to a range of perceived rights rejections by their states (see Mayerfeld 2011; Stone Sweet 2012). It provides a crucial suprastate laboratory for studying both the potentialities for, and likely challenges to, the kinds of global accountability mechanisms discussed here, as well as for exploring next-step questions around the weight that should be given to domestic standards in the actual specification and suprastate judicial interpretations of constitutionalized rights.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Diversity and cosmopolitan democracy: Avoiding global democratic relativism

Cabrera

2015

Glob. Con.

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Many recent arguments for trans-state and global democracy would offer broad leeway on constitutionalized right standards to states, and few formal mechanisms for individuals to challenge domestic rights rejections beyond the state. Such a stance, it is shown here, tends to be rooted in implicit presumptions of domestic consensus. Challenges are offered to this and related presumptions in accounts of cosmopolitan democracy, as well as global variants of liberal nationalism and political liberalism. An alternative, primarily instrumental approach to trans-state and global democracy is detailed. It would give emphasis to ways in which formal suprastate participation, complemented by challenge mechanisms for individuals, could play a crucial role in helping to strengthen individual rights protections within states. The case for adopting such an approach is reinforced through attention to the efforts of a persistent domestic democratic minority – Dalits in India – to reach out to the global human rights regime for help in pressuring their own state to better protect rights against exclusion and subjugation.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Diversity and cosmopolitan democracy: Avoiding global democratic relativism

Cabrera

2015

Glob. Con.

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“…As Dieter Grimm explains, the European Convention of Human Rights departs from traditional conceptions of sovereignty in that it ‘grants member states the rights to take another country’s human rights violations before the court (article 33) … Second, it … also allows individuals to bring proceedings against member states for violations of the rights protected in the convention (article 34)’ (Grimm 2015: 88). Together with the European Court of Justice, which exercises jurisdiction over the 28 members of the European Union, these new institutions have created an unprecedented regime of cosmopolitan human rights protection (Stone Sweet 2012: 53–90).…”

Section: The World Of Legal Cosmopolitanism: An Institutional Perspecmentioning

confidence: 99%

The new sovereigntism and transnational law: Legal utopianism, democratic scepticism and statist realism

Benhabib

2016

Glob. Con.

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Abstract:This article examines the contemporary debate about the spread of transnational law and its sovereigntist critiques. Sovereigntists argue that the rapid development of international and transnational treaties and the emergence of regional human rights courts such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) undermine sovereignty and thus pose a threat to democratic self-determination. I criticise the new sovereigntism and argue that transnational human rights strengthen rather than weaken democratic sovereignty, and name processes through which rights-norms are contextualised in polities ‘democratic iterations’. I develop the ‘authorship model of democratic legitimacy’ in order to show how constitutional rights and international human rights can be understood to be in harmony and dissonance with one another. The challenge is to think beyond the binarisms of the cosmopolitan versus the civic republican; democratic versus the international and transnational; democratic sovereignty versus human rights law. Distinguishing between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty enables us to do so. By constraining certain sovereign powers of the state, international human rights regimes and courts can enhance popular sovereignty in that they strengthen the rights of the marginalised and the excluded. The article also briefly touches upon the significance of the Alien Tort Statute in US courts from the standpoint of the development of international human rights norms and focuses onHirst v the United Kingdom, recently adjudicated by the ECtHR, to substantiate the distinction between state and popular sovereignty.

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“…MacCormick 1999; Weiler 2003; Beck and Grande 2004; Brunkhorst 2005: Ch. 7; Benhabib 2006, 170–4; Habermas 2006; Brown 2008: 436; Cabrera 2010, 525; Stone Sweet, 2012).…”

Section: Some Observations On Ios and The Eumentioning

confidence: 99%

Why strong moral cosmopolitanism requires a world-state

Dufek

2013

Int. Theory

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The article deals with a pivotal conceptual distinction used in philosophical discussions about global justice. Cosmopolitans claim that arguing from the perspective of moral cosmopolitanism does not necessarily entail defending a global coercive political authority, or a ‘world-state’, and suggest that ambitious political and economic (social) goals implied in moral cosmopolitanism may be achieved via some kind of non-hierarchical, dispersed and/or decentralized institutional arrangements. I argue that insofar as moral cosmopolitans retain ‘strong’ moral claims, this is an untenable position, and that the goals of cosmopolitan justice, as explicated by its major proponents, require nothing less than a global state-like entity with coercive powers. My background ambition is to supplement some existing works questioning the notion of ‘governance without government’ with an argument that goes right to the conceptual heart of cosmopolitan thought. To embed my central theoretical argument in real-world developments, I draw on some recent scholarship regarding the nature of international organizations, European Union, or transnational democratization. Finally, I suggest that only after curbing moral aspirations in the first place can a more self-consciously moderate position be constructed, one that will carry practical and feasible implications for institutional design.

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A cosmopolitan legal order: Constitutional pluralism and rights adjudication in Europe

Cited by 61 publications

References 51 publications

Diversity and cosmopolitan democracy: Avoiding global democratic relativism

Diversity and cosmopolitan democracy: Avoiding global democratic relativism

The new sovereigntism and transnational law: Legal utopianism, democratic scepticism and statist realism

Why strong moral cosmopolitanism requires a world-state

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