A Coordination Framework Based on the Sociology of Organized Action

Sibertin-Blanc, Christophe; Amblard, Frédéric; Mailliard, M.

doi:10.1007/11775331_1

Cited by 24 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In the following, we briefly describe the basic social game formalization, as given in (Sibertin-Blanc et al, 2006).…”

Section: Formalization Of a Fragment Of Soamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…SOA was formalized in (Sibertin-Blanc et al, 2006), and is employed in the interactive environment SocLab (available at sourceforge.net), which allows the user to edit the structure of a SCA, to analyze the properties of this structure and to simulate the behaviour of the social actors (Mailliard et al, 2003). This formalization was transposed to the fuzzy setting in (Sandri and Sibertin-Blanc, 2007a).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, we extend the original formalization of SOA given in (Sibertin-Blanc et al, 2006) by making it possible to assemble the resources of an organization in a hierarchy, so that we may consider resources that are the synthesis of lower levels ones. In this way, each member of the organization may have his own representation of the resources that are the basis of his relationships with others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

A Partial-View Cooperation Framework Based on the Sociology of Organized Action

Santos¹,

Sandri²,

Sibertin-Blanc³

2008

Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems

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“…In the following, we briefly describe the basic social game formalization, as given in (Sibertin-Blanc et al, 2006).…”

Section: Formalization Of a Fragment Of Soamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A Partial-View Cooperation Framework Based on the Sociology of Organized Action

Santos¹,

Sandri²,

Sibertin-Blanc³

2008

Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems

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show abstract

“…Particular configurations of the relations of power in an organization (principal, supervisor, agent) have been investigated by Vafaï [5,6], who analysed couplings between different kinds of collusions in terms of mathematical theorems. The approach by Sibertin-Blanc and coworkers [8][9][10] develops the frames of SA in a consistent and methodical way. In this approach, each agent (actor) controls some relations which other agents can profit by.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Please note, that for a group of N = 4 agents a number 3 3 = 27 is also a number of possible sequences ν ij , which appears in η i parameter definition [Eq (8)…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Game of collusions

Malarz¹,

Kułakowski²

2016

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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A new model of collusions in an organization is proposed. Each actor $a_{i=1,\cdots,N}$ disposes one unique good $g_{j=1,\cdots,N}$. Each actor $a_i$ has also a list of other goods which he/she needs, in order from desired most to those desired less. Finally, each actor $a_i$ has also a list of other agents, initially ordered at random. The order in the last list means the order of the access of the actors to the good $g_j$. A pair after a pair of agents tries to make a transaction. This transaction is possible if each of two actors can be shifted upwards in the list of actors possessed by the partner. Our numerical results indicate, that the average time of evolution scales with the number $N$ of actors approximately as $N^{2.9}$. For each actor, we calculate the Kendall's rank correlation between the order of desired goods and actor's place at the lists of the good's possessors. We also calculate individual utility funcions $\eta_i$, where goods are weighted according to how strongly they are desired by an actor $a_i$, and how easily they can be accessed by $a_i$. Although the individual utility functions can increase or decrease in the time course, its value averaged over actors and independent simulations does increase in time. This means that the system of collusions is profitable for the members of the organization

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Formal Modeling and Analysis of Organizations

Broek

Jonker

Sharpanskykh

et al. 2006

Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Multi-Agent Systems

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Organizations have proven to be a useful paradigm for analyzing and designing Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) [2]. Representation of MAS as an organization consisting of roles and groups can tackle major drawbacks present in traditional multi-agent models; e.g., high complexity and poor predictability of dynamics in a system. Moreover, organizational research has recognized the advantages of agent-based models; e.g., for analysis of structure and dynamics of real organizations [1]. However, formal theories, approaches, and tools for designing such models are rare.In this paper, we propose an approach for formal specification of organizations. In contrast to most social science theories it can capture both structural and dynamic aspects of the organization formally and, subsequently, has four advantages: (1) Formal representation of organization structure (including specifications of actors (or roles), relations between them, and information flows).(2) The means for simulations of different scenarios on the basis of a model and observing their results.(3) Organization analysis by means of verifying static and dynamic properties against either simulated scenarios or (formalized) empirical data, taken from real organizations. (4) Diagnosis of inconsistencies, redundancies, and errors in structure and functioning of real organizations and providing recommendations for their improvement (e.g., with regard to organizational performance indicators).Both the general (or abstracted) structure and the behavior of organizations is specified by a generic (or template) model, which is used for a high level organization analysis. For a more detailed analysis, a deployed model is introduced. Such a model is based on both unfolded generic relations between roles, as defined in the generic model, and on creating new role instances. For each role instance, a set of requirements is identified. These requirements are imposed onto the agents, who will eventually enact these roles. For formalizing structural and dynamic aspects of both a template model and a deployed model, ontologies specified in an order-sorted logic are used.The specification of an organization structure in a template and a deployed model uses the following elements: (1) A role that represents a subset of functionalities, performed by an organization, abstracted from specific agents that fulfill them. In contrast to many other organization models from computational organization theory and artificial intelligence, each role in the proposed model can be composed by several other roles, until the necessary level of detail of aggregation is achieved. A role that is composed of (interacting) subroles, is called a composite role. Each role has an input and an output interface, which facilitate in the interaction (communication) with other roles. (2) An interaction link, which represents an information channel between two roles at the same aggregation level. (3) Frequently ignored in other organization models environment is represented as a special component of the proposed mod...

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A Coordination Framework Based on the Sociology of Organized Action

Cited by 24 publications

References 6 publications

A Partial-View Cooperation Framework Based on the Sociology of Organized Action

A Partial-View Cooperation Framework Based on the Sociology of Organized Action

Game of collusions

Formal Modeling and Analysis of Organizations

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