Proceedings of the 3d Conference on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI-10) 2010
DOI: 10.2991/agi.2010.10
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

A conversion between utility and information

Abstract: Rewards typically express desirabilities or preferences over a set of alternatives. Here we propose that rewards can be defined for any probability distribution based on three desiderata, namely that rewards should be realvalued, additive and order-preserving, where the latter implies that more probable events should also be more desirable. Our main result states that rewards are then uniquely determined by the negative information content. To analyze stochastic processes, we define the utility of a realizatio… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
31
0

Year Published

2011
2011
2017
2017

Publication Types

Select...
5
2
1

Relationship

3
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 18 publications
(31 citation statements)
references
References 13 publications
(10 reference statements)
0
31
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Here, computational cost is defined as the average effort of computational adaptation (measured by the mutual information) multiplied by the price of information processing. This definition is motivated by first principles (Mattsson and Weibull, 2002;Ortega and Braun, 2010;Ortega and Braun, 2011) and is grounded in a thermodynamic framework for decision-making (Ortega and Braun, 2013). Mathematically, the basic principle is identical to the principle behind rate-distortion theory, the information-theoretic framework for lossy compression (Genewein and Braun, 2013;Still, 2014).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Here, computational cost is defined as the average effort of computational adaptation (measured by the mutual information) multiplied by the price of information processing. This definition is motivated by first principles (Mattsson and Weibull, 2002;Ortega and Braun, 2010;Ortega and Braun, 2011) and is grounded in a thermodynamic framework for decision-making (Ortega and Braun, 2013). Mathematically, the basic principle is identical to the principle behind rate-distortion theory, the information-theoretic framework for lossy compression (Genewein and Braun, 2013;Still, 2014).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, a bounded rational decision-maker has only limited resources and therefore needs to strike some compromise between the desired utility and the required resource costs [14]. In particular, we suggest an information-theoretic measure of resource costs that can be derived axiomatically [11]. As a consequence we obtain a variational principle for choice probabilities that trades off maximizing a given utility criterion and avoiding resource costs that arise due to deviating from initially given default choice probabilities.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such a bounded rational strategy must therefore be described by a probability distribution P (a i ) reflecting this uncertainty. Information-theoretic models of bounded rational decision making quantify the cost of information-processing by entropic measures of information [15][16][17][31][32][33][34][35] and are closely related to softmax-choice rules that have been extensively studied in the psychological and econometric literature, but also in the literature on reinforcement learning and game theory [36][37][38][39][40][41][42]. In [31][32][33][34], Ortega and Braun discuss an information-theoretic model of bounded rational decision making where information processing costs are quantified by the relative entropy with the idea that information processing costs can then be measured with respect to changes in the choice strategy P (a i ).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The main question of this article is how to relate this simple model of bounded rationality to the information-theoretic bounded rationality model discussed in Ortega and Braun [31][32][33][34] that we recapitulate in the next section.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%