A Contract-Ruled Economic Model for QoS Guarantee in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Streaming Services

Yang, Libin; Lou, Wei

doi:10.1109/tmc.2015.2456920

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 25 publications

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“…Recently, P2P networks have evolved into a new phase where quality of service (QoS) plays an increasingly important role in users’ behavior on network. P2P users now are not only concerned about amount of content they can acquire from a network, that is, level of service, but also sensitive to length of time it takes to complete downloading, that is, quality of service (Yang and Lou 2016). In fact, for large networks, the P2P paradigm have its inherent advantage over the centralized server paradigm with respect to QoS guarantee because of its decentralized structure and its utilization of bandwidth optimization techniques like load balancing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality of Service Based Pricing Schemes for Content Sharing in Peer‐to‐Peer Networks

Lin

et al. 2017

Production and Operations Management

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In this paper, we study quality‐of‐service (QoS) based pricing schemes that serve as incentive mechanisms to induce sharing behaviors in Peer‐to‐Peer (P2P) networks. We incorporate operational QoS metrics into users’ utility functions and demonstrate how they affect individual users’ content sharing decisions. Using a game‐theoretic model, our study reveals how organizations respond to the changes of operational QoS metrics in their design of pricing schemes for various business objectives at different stages of network evolution. Our results show that a higher upload capacity can foster rational sharing to start when the network is small; however, it also discourages sharing behaviors when the network becomes large. In order to induce a socially optimal behavior, a pricing scheme will not charge users for requesting content while compensating them for sharing content. Such compensation is found to increase faster with the network size when the network is large. In order to maximize the profit of a monopolistic provider, however, a pricing scheme will charge content requests with a positive price while providing less compensation to sharing users compared to the socially optimal scheme. When the network size is small, such compensation can be even negative, which implies that a monopolistic provider discourages content sharing when the network is small, but encourages it when the network becomes larger. In addition, we find that more information about peer upload capacity discourages peers to share.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%