A Continuous Dilemma

Friedman, Daniel; Oprea, Ryan

doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.337

Cited by 134 publications

(133 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

109

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…First, one could consider changes in the value of T that are in an even smaller neighborhood of the threshold value that differentiates the SH from the PD to examine whether such smaller changes might give precedents even more weight. In addition, one might explore the role of precedent across similar games played in continuous time; Friedman and Oprea (2012), for instance, report varying but very high cooperation rates for different parameterizations of the Prisoner's Dilemma game played by subjects in continuous time. It would be of interest to consider play in continuous (or near continuous) time across similar classes of games including the Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma games or the Battle of the Sexes and Chicken games.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: experimental evidence on the role of precedents

Duffy

Fehr

2017

Exp Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Dietmar Fehr WZB Copyright remains with the author(s).Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the institute as a whole. We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game forms. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry over to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game despite the possibility of efficient play in the latter game. Similarly, a precedent of inefficient play in the Prisoner's Dilemma game does not extend to the repeated Stag Hunt game. We conclude that equilibrium selection between similar repeated games has little to do with historical precedents and is mainly determined by strategic considerations associated with the different payouts of these similar repeated games.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: experimental evidence on the role of precedents

Duffy

Fehr

2017

Exp Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Another problem is the affecting of the numerous factors that are not in a close proximity with the basic characteristics of the evaluated object, such as the inflation rate, economic situation, etc. It's remarkable that these kinds of cost evaluation method's shortcomings are described in the well-known works by such scientific authorities as M. Friedman [15], L. I. Abalkin [16], G. Odum [17] et al…”

Section: Instruments Of the Evolutionary Economics Used For The Evalumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It seems to be noteworthy the position of M. Friedman [15] suggesting that economic theory can be exact and objective as much as natural sciences. The problems of objectivity and reliability of measurements and estimates in economy were figuratively described by A.…”

Section: Instruments Of the Evolutionary Economics Used For The Evalumentioning

confidence: 99%

Methodology of the evolutionary economics in application to the engineering problems

Kolbachev

2017

SHS Web Conf.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Authors present an idea that the consulting engineering services are a type of knowledge mediation institution. This institution decreases a possibility of the participants' opportunistic behaviour during the purchase and sale deal making. It's actual, first of all, for the knowledge products, such as innovation projects and R&D results, and other search goods. In the article authors present a set of measurement instruments to make a said kind of valuation. Concept of the set is based on one of the evolutionary economics' methodologies: a technological structure method. As a criteria for attributing a project to one or another technological structure are used a level of the real technology's compliance with the extremely efficient, information materialization level, dimension scale of the forming processes and dominant management concept. The approach gives a possibility to minimize the possibility of the existence of the innovation processes participants' opportunistic behaviour, and to increase the efficiency of the innovation activities..

show abstract

“…The first one corresponds to continuous-time experiments, the second to "timing experiments", with a special emphasis on the experimental bank-runs literature. Continuous time experiments started years ago, with Friedman and Cheung (2009) and Morgan and Brunnermeier (2010) (whose working papers appeared around 2003/04), but it has not been until recently that this experimental technique has taken off with Oprea et al (2009) and Anderson et al (2010) looking into strategic investment decisions, Oprea et al (2011) studying the evolutionary equilibrium of the hawk and dove game, Friedman and Oprea (2012) experimenting with the effects of response delay in a repeated prisoners dilemma game, and Rabanal (2012) looking at mortgage default timing. While none of these papers directly address any of the questions of our paper, they are a good reference for the methodological design of our experiment.…”

Section: Why Run An Experiments On Abcp?mentioning

confidence: 99%

That's How We Roll: An Experiment on Rollover Risk

Bosch-Rosa

2014

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is consensus that the recent financial crisis revolved around a crash of the short-term credit market. Yet there is no agreement around the necessary policies to prevent another credit freeze. In this experiment we test the effects that contract length has on the market-wide supply of short-term credit. Our main result is that, while credit markets with shorter maturities are less prone to freezes, the optimal policy should be state-dependent, favoring long contracts when the economy is in good shape, and allowing for short-term contracts when the economy is in a recession. We also report runs on firms with strong fundamentals, something that cannot be observed in the canonical static models of financial panics. Finally, we show that our experimental design produces rich learning dynamics, with a text-book bubble and crash pattern in the short-term credit market.

show abstract

A Continuous Dilemma

Cited by 134 publications

References 16 publications

Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: experimental evidence on the role of precedents

Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: experimental evidence on the role of precedents

Methodology of the evolutionary economics in application to the engineering problems

That's How We Roll: An Experiment on Rollover Risk

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About