A Contest Success Function with a Tractable Noise Parameter

Amegashie, J. Atsu

doi:10.2139/ssrn.427660

“…Indeed, β measures the degree of noise in this contest success function (see Amegashie (2003) for a detailed discussion of this contest success function). …”

Section: A Model With Partial Burning Outmentioning

confidence: 99%

Burning Out in Sequential Elimination Contests

Amegashie

¹

2003

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“…Because > 0, this introduces a level of complexity that is even absent in a single Tullock contest with non-identical contestants. 8 Note that for a fixed value of , the contest success function in the quantity contest, given by , boils down to the contest success function in Amegashie (2006). Therefore, the corner solution for one of the effort levels in proposition 2 is consistent with the analysis in Amegashie (2006).…”

mentioning

confidence: 65%

Quantity-Cum-Quality Contests

Amegashie

¹

2018

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Quantity-cum-Quality Contests Abstract I consider a contest in which the quantity of output is rewarded and another in which the quality of output is rewarded. The output in the quality contest plays a dual role. It counts in the quality contest but it is also converted into quantity-equivalent output to obtain total output in the quantity contest. This latter feature implies that the two contests are interlinked. Examples abound. There are contests in which there is a prize for the number (quantity) of publications by a scholar, a politician's accomplishments, an athlete's number of Olympic medals, etc and there is also a prize for a scholar's publications in top journals, a politician's major accomplishments, or an athlete's number of Olympic gold medals . I find that when the unit cost of producing quality is sufficiently high, then treating quality and quantity as the same has a disincentive effect on the production of quality. In contrast, when the unit cost of producing quality is sufficiently low, treating quality and quantity as the same has no disincentive effect on the production of quality. There is an equilibrium in which high-ability and low-ability contestants, in spite of being non-identical, have the same probability of winning the quantity contest. When contestants are budget-constrained, I find that whether an increase in the budget will increase effort in the quality contest depends on the size of the initial budget. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Codes: D720.

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“…The same is true for Amegashie's (2006) contest success function with noise that creates a lottery contest without the possibility of a draw yet minimum e¤orts. Further generalizations would clearly be interesting.…”

Section: The Lottery Contest Admits a Br-potentialmentioning

confidence: 86%

The Lottery Contest is a Best-Response Potential Game

Ewerhart

¹

2017

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. It is shown that the n-player lottery contest admits a best-response potential (Voorneveld, 2000, Economics Letters). This is true also when the contest technology re ‡ects the possibility of a draw. The result implies, in particular, the existence of a nontrivial example of a strictly competitive game that is best-response equivalent to a game with identical payo¤ functions. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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A Contest Success Function with a Tractable Noise Parameter

Cited by 21 publications

References 34 publications

Burning Out in Sequential Elimination Contests

Burning Out in Sequential Elimination Contests

Quantity-Cum-Quality Contests

The Lottery Contest is a Best-Response Potential Game

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