2011
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-22263-4_13
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A Constraint Satisfaction Cryptanalysis of Bloom Filters in Private Record Linkage

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Cited by 91 publications
(103 citation statements)
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“…All attacks will be described shortly. Kuzu et al (2011) sampled 20,000 records from a voter registration list and encrypted the bigrams of forenames (with k = 15 and l = 500). The authors formulated their attack as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) which defines a set of variables, which have to satisfy certain constraints.…”
Section: Attacks On Bloom Filtersmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…All attacks will be described shortly. Kuzu et al (2011) sampled 20,000 records from a voter registration list and encrypted the bigrams of forenames (with k = 15 and l = 500). The authors formulated their attack as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) which defines a set of variables, which have to satisfy certain constraints.…”
Section: Attacks On Bloom Filtersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Usually special programs called CSP solvers are used for this. To limit the problem size given to the CSP solver, Kuzu et al (2011) used a frequency analysis of the identifiers from the voter registration list and of the Bloom filters encodings. For assigning possible names to the Bloom filters, generated frequency intervals for the forenames in the voting list and for the Bloom filters were applied.…”
Section: Attacks On Bloom Filtersmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Bloom filters are then compared for similarity, instead of the n-grams. Kuzu et al recently demonstrated an attack that can utilize a global dataset with demographic data (often available publicly) to determine what input strings were used to create the Bloom filter encodings [26]. In a follow up study, the authors demonstrated that the attack is feasible in practice, but the speed and precision of the attack may be worse than theoretical predictions [27].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Two partially successful attacks on Bloom filters using a Constraint Satisfaction Solver have been reported by [42], [43]. In the more recent study, the authors used combined Bloom filters (a CLK variant).…”
Section: A Security Of Bloom Filter-based Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%