A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition: The case of memory

Barnier, Amanda J.; Sutton, John; Harris, Celia B.; Wilson, Robert A.

doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.07.002

Cited by 158 publications

(156 citation statements)

References 81 publications

(92 reference statements)

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“…The social nature of encoding can be conceptualized as existing on a continuum, ranging from completely unshared to completely shared (see also Barnier et al, 2008). On this continuum, our shared encoding task ranked relatively highly, since it was an interactive task that required discussion between group members and involved linking each word to the groups' existing shared knowledge and an agreed-upon cue.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shared encoding and the costs and benefits of collaborative recall.

Harris

Barnier

Sutton

2013

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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We often remember in the company of others. In particular, we routinely collaborate with friends, family, or colleagues to remember shared experiences. But surprisingly, in the experimental collaborative recall paradigm, collaborative groups remember less than their potential, an effect termed collaborative inhibition. Rajaram and Pereira-Pasarin (2010) argued that the effects of collaboration on recall are determined by "pre-collaborative" factors. We studied the role of 2 pre-collaborative factors-shared encoding and group relationship-in determining the costs and benefits of collaborative recall. In Experiment 1, we compared groups of strangers who encoded alone versus together, before collaborating to recall. In Experiment 2, we compared groups of friends who encoded alone versus together, before collaborating to recall. We found that shared encoding abolished collaborative inhibition in both Experiments 1 and 2. But prior relationship did not influence collaborative inhibition over and above the effects of shared encoding. Regardless of encoding condition, collaborative group recall contained fewer intrusions than nominal group recall, and these benefits continued in subsequent individual recall. Our findings demonstrate that pre-collaborative factors-specifically shared encoding-have flow-on benefits for group and individual recall amount, but not recall accuracy. We discuss these findings in terms of self-and cross-cuing in collaborative recall.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shared encoding and the costs and benefits of collaborative recall.

Harris

Barnier

Sutton

2013

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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“…After the instructional sequences everyone cuts Brussels sprouts for a while and everyone's attention and gaze is directed at the work process on the Anette comments that they are working like an assembly line (19)(20)(21)(22).…”

Section: Chopping Brussels Sprouts: Shared Attentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Developmental psychologists have suggested that collaboration between children as well as with grown-ups are essential for understanding psychological development (Lave & Wenger, 1991;Rogoff, 1998). Other researchers have pointed out that many cognitive tasks as well as the performance of many everyday chores presuppose collaboration between several persons and that they share cognitive resources in the collaborative process (Barnier, Sutton, Harris & Wilson, 2008;Clark, 1996;Hutchins, 1996;Michaelian & Sutton, 2013;Sawyer, 2003). Finally a number of researchers have shown how persons with cognitive and communicative disabilities can communicate and solve problems through collaboration with others and compensate cognitive loss by drawing on the cognitive and linguistic resources of other participants (Dixon & Gould, 1998;Goodwin, 2004;Harris, Keil, Sutton, Barnier & McIlwain, 2011;Müller & Mok, 2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

Cutting Brussels sprouts: Collaboration involving persons with dementia

Hydén¹

2014

Journal of Aging Studies

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How people with dementia collaborate with other people is an area in need of more research and conceptualizations. Collaboration introduces a number of new possibilities and demands concerning cognitive and linguistic abilities and it is suggested that a theoretical framework that emphasize that cognitive resources are not exclusively individual, but are part of cognitive and communicative context. In this article focus is on joint activities and their collaborative organization is analyzed using an example involving persons with dementia working together with staff preparing a meal. The analysis shows that persons with dementia are able to collaborate in fairly advanced activities if they are supported in such a way that they can make use of the cognitive and linguistic resources of others, in particular cognitive

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“…11 Proponents of the distributed cognition thesis go even further: they claim that a cognitive system could extend to include not only an artifact which an individual agent uses, but also several individuals and their epistemic artifacts (Hutchins, 1995, Theiner & O'Connor, 2010, Sutton et al, 2008. In other words, a cognitive process could be distributed among several individuals and their epistemic artifacts.…”

Section: The Process-centered Approach Of Group Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the discussion on the extended mind and the extended cognition theses see: (Trybulec, 2014a(Trybulec, , 2014b(Trybulec, , 2015b. the existence of non-linear relations that arise out of continuous reciprocal interactions between the contributing parts (Palermos, 2015;Chemero, 2009;Sutton et al, 2008;Theiner & O'Connor, 2010;Wegner et al, 1985). These relations give rise to new properties of a system that do not belong to its individual parts.…”

Section: The Process-centered Approach Of Group Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality

Trybulec¹

2017

AVANT

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In the paper, I distinguish the bottom-up strategy and the intentional stance strategy of analyzing group intentional states, and show that the thesis of distributed group subject of knowledge could be accommodated by either of them. Moreover, I argue that when combined with virtue reliabilism the thesis satisfactorily explains the phenomenon of group knowledge. To justify my argument, in the second part of the paper, I distinguish two accounts of justification pointing to conditions of group knowledge. The first, which I call the belief-centered approach to group intentional states, determines the concept of group belief and group justificatory reason. The second, the process-centered approach represented by S. Orestis Palermos, employs the theory of virtue reliabilism and focuses on the group knowledge-conducive process. In the paper, I argue in favor of the latter as the internalism associated with the former appears to lack sufficient explanatory power. The theory of virtue epistemology runs into considerable difficulties when trying to deal with an extended epistemic subject composed of one individual and her cognitive artifact. In the two last parts of the paper, I consider the most important difficulties and argue that these obstacles are overcome once one adopts an approach combining virtue epistemology and the thesis of distributed group epistemic subject.

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A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition: The case of memory

Cited by 158 publications

References 81 publications

Shared encoding and the costs and benefits of collaborative recall.

Shared encoding and the costs and benefits of collaborative recall.

Cutting Brussels sprouts: Collaboration involving persons with dementia

Group as a Distributed Subject of Knowledge: Between Radicalism and Triviality

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