A comprehensive meta-analysis of money priming.

Lodder, Paul; Ong, How Hwee; Grasman, Raoul P. P. P.; Wicherts, Jelte M.

doi:10.1037/xge0000570

Cited by 59 publications

(80 citation statements)

References 90 publications

(104 reference statements)

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“…Despite the current findings, it is important to note that recent large-scale replication projects have failed to replicate some money priming effects (Klein et al 2014;Rohrer et al 2015;Caruso et al 2017). However, a recently performed meta-analysis on both published and unpublished experiments using money priming manipulations (Lodder et al 2019) yielded a reasonably large overall effect size estimate, although the magnitude of money priming effects was dependent on the design of studies. Vohs (2015) suggested possible reasons for the failed replications.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Researchcontrasting

confidence: 60%

Money priming and children’s self-evaluations

Trzcińska

2020

Curr Psychol

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Previous studies have shown that money priming changes adults' behavior and self-esteem, making them become more congruent with market mode. Money priming has also been seen to change behavior in children who have yet develop a complete understanding of its instrumental functions. Since money's association with markets changes people's behavior even in childhood, it is possible that its links and ties to self-esteem are forged at an early stage in life. The studies presented in this article aimed to verify how money priming affects various types of self-evaluations made by children. Two experimental studies were conducted. A total of 83 children aged 8-10 years took part in the first study, while 103 children aged 4-6 years took part in the second study. The results demonstrate that priming with money may change some, but not all, of children's self-evaluations. Subsequent to money priming, children's self-evaluations became more congruent with market mode: under the influence of money priming, children's self-evaluations increased in domains involving perceived competences (associated with feelings of agency), but did not increase in domains related to social relationships.

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Section: Limitations and Future Researchcontrasting

confidence: 60%

Money priming and children’s self-evaluations

Trzcińska

2020

Curr Psychol

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“…The available longitudinal evidence suggests that Time 1 explicit attitudes predict Time 2 behaviors far better than past behaviors predict future self-reported attitudes, calling into question the prevalence of post hoc rationalizations for past actions (Bentler & Speckart 1981;Fredricks & Dossett 1983;Kahle & Berman 1979). Popular perspectives on attitude-behavioral relations may be "surprise-hacked" (Felin et al 2019), overemphasizing instances in which behaviors cause explicit preferences (Bem 1972;Festinger 1962), and automatic and unintentional processes determine human behavior outside of conscious awareness (Caruso et al 2017;Forscher et al 2019;Lodder et al 2019;McCarthy et al 2018;Oswald et al 2015). Although further longitudinal and metaanalytic investigations are needed, the "boring" narrative that conscious preferences and intentions typically direct future actions may capture a far greater share of the variance (Armitage & Conner 2001;Ajzen 1985;Fishbein & Ajzen 1975;Randall & Wolff 1994;Sheppard et al 1988;Webb & Sheeran 2006), relegating the rationalizations-are-rational thesis to address only a small portion of the attitude-behavior relationship.…”

Section: Quantifying the Prevalence And Adaptiveness Of Behavioral Ramentioning

confidence: 99%

Rationalization is rational

Cushman¹

2019

Behav Brain Sci

120

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Rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts the beliefs and desires that would have made it rational. Then, people often adjust their own beliefs and desires to match the concocted ones. While many studies demonstrate rationalization, and a few theories describe its underlying cognitive mechanisms, we have little understanding of its function. Why is the mind designed to construct post hoc rationalizations of its behavior, and then to adopt them? This may accomplish an important task: transferring information between the different kinds of processes and representations that influence our behavior. Human decision making does not rely on a single process; it is influenced by reason, habit, instinct, norms, and so on. Several of these influences are not organized according to rational choice (i.e., computing and maximizing expected value). Rationalization extracts implicit information – true beliefs and useful desires – from the influence of these non-rational systems on behavior. This is a useful fiction – fiction, because it imputes reason to non-rational psychological processes; useful, because it can improve subsequent reasoning. More generally, rationalization belongs to the broader class of representational exchange mechanisms, which transfer information between many different kinds of psychological representations that guide our behavior. Representational exchange enables us to represent any information in the manner best suited to the particular tasks that require it, balancing accuracy, efficiency, and flexibility in thought. The theory of representational exchange reveals connections between rationalization and theory of mind, inverse reinforcement learning, thought experiments, and reflective equilibrium.

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“…meta-analysis by Vadillo, Hardwicke, and Shanks (2016) suggests that the seminal findings on money priming that inspired the entire field (i.e., Vohs et al, 2006) might have been biased by selective reporting and other questionable research practices (see also Lodder, Ong, Grasman, & Wicherts, 2019). Moreover, in a recent effort to shed light onto these mixed effects, Caruso, Shapira, and Landy (2017) investigated, across three high-powered studies (N = 4,649), the degree to which different money priming manipulations affect different self-other focus related selfreports.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Effect of Money Priming on Self-Focus in the Imitation-Inhibition Task

Genschow

Schuler

Cracco

et al. 2019

Experimental Psychology

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Abstract. The self-sufficiency hypothesis suggests that priming individuals with money makes them focus more strongly on themselves than on others. However, recently, research supporting this claim has been heavily criticized and some attempts to replicate have failed. A reason for the inconsistent findings in the field may lay in the common use of explicit measures, because they tend to rely on one or just a few items and are thus prone to demand effects and low reliability. In the present research, we administered, in two experiments, the imitation-inhibition task – a robust, unobtrusive, and reliable paradigm that is sensitive to self-other focus on a trial-by-trial basis. A pilot study found an increased focus on the self as compared to others when primed with money. Building on this finding, a preregistered high-powered experiment replicated this effect, suggesting that money primes may indeed increase a focus on the self. An additionally carried out meta-analysis indicates that automatic imitation is modulated by self-other focus and that money primes lead to a smaller focus on the self than conventional methods. Overall, the found effects are rather small and several limitations, such as order effects, call for a cautious interpretation of the findings.

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A comprehensive meta-analysis of money priming.

Cited by 59 publications

References 90 publications

Money priming and children’s self-evaluations

Money priming and children’s self-evaluations

Rationalization is rational

The Effect of Money Priming on Self-Focus in the Imitation-Inhibition Task

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