2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jisa.2015.11.001
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A comprehensive approach to discriminate DDoS attacks from flash events

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Cited by 39 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…Particularly in the case of lowrate DDoS attacks, attack traffics exhibit specific anomaly characteristics, such as the number of flows and packets that present differences in distributions or statistics compared with those of legitimate traffics. For example, an anomaly characteristic of low-rate DDoS attacks is that every single packet forwarded in the network is legitimate since the packet's head information fulfills all legal requirements of the network-transmission protocols; however, the intentional aggregation of these packets at victim hosts by attackers exhibits abnormal statistical deviations [12]. In addition, as the low-rate DDoS packets are purposely created by prebuilt programs, the features of these packets are highly similar [13,14].…”
Section: Detection Algorithmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Particularly in the case of lowrate DDoS attacks, attack traffics exhibit specific anomaly characteristics, such as the number of flows and packets that present differences in distributions or statistics compared with those of legitimate traffics. For example, an anomaly characteristic of low-rate DDoS attacks is that every single packet forwarded in the network is legitimate since the packet's head information fulfills all legal requirements of the network-transmission protocols; however, the intentional aggregation of these packets at victim hosts by attackers exhibits abnormal statistical deviations [12]. In addition, as the low-rate DDoS packets are purposely created by prebuilt programs, the features of these packets are highly similar [13,14].…”
Section: Detection Algorithmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Source IP address entropy, its standard deviation with respect to traffic cluster entropy are computed without attack. The experimental results are compared with the work influenced by [20] which is our prior work. The existing system is our own simulation whose results are compared with the proposed system.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Sachdeva et al [20] employed optimal thresholds for traffic cluster entropy and utilized receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC), detection rates and false positive rates for evaluating their method. Their method was meant for discriminating DDoS attack from flash events.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They used the FIFA World Cup dataset (http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/contrib/WorldCup.html) dataset for representing FE traffic and the CAIDA dataset to represent DDoS attacks. Sachdeva et al [13] used cluster entropy in combination with source IP entropy to discriminate DDoS attacks from FEs. They observed that the traffic cluster entropy drops dramatically during FEs because most of the traffic is generated from already-visited source networks, whereas the traffic cluster entropy increases in HR-DDoS attacks.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yu et al [10,11] used Shannon entropy to detect HR-DDoS attacks and FEs based on packet size and ID, but their proposed system did not consider the detection of different types of DDoS attacks. Sachdeva et al [13] computed Shannon's entropy metric to detect FEs and HR-DDoS attack traffic. However, we obtained a better TPR (95%) in case of GID metric than in their proposed scheme (82%).…”
Section: Comparison With Existing Workmentioning
confidence: 99%