2011
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1764031
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A Comparison of the Tax-Motivated Income Shifting of Multinationals in Territorial and Worldwide Countries

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Cited by 62 publications
(86 citation statements)
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“…First, our results suggest that the tax system to which the parent company is subject and its interplay with foreign tax systems shapes taxrelevant decisions of multinationals and their subsidiaries. In line with the theory provided by Scholes et al (2015), we show that a worldwide tax system not only affects income shifting (Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers 2012;Markle 2016), but also provides incentives for those subsidiaries operating abroad to be less tax aggressive.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 91%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…First, our results suggest that the tax system to which the parent company is subject and its interplay with foreign tax systems shapes taxrelevant decisions of multinationals and their subsidiaries. In line with the theory provided by Scholes et al (2015), we show that a worldwide tax system not only affects income shifting (Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers 2012;Markle 2016), but also provides incentives for those subsidiaries operating abroad to be less tax aggressive.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…Markle (2016) shows that parent companies subject to worldwide tax systems shift income to a lesser extent than parent companies subject to territorial systems.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Hence, results could be overstated or undervalued, and it may be necessary to control for the other affiliated companies' tax rates. Laeven (2008), De Simone (2016) and Markle (2016) use a measure of the tax incentive that captures all taxes of the countries in which the multinational groups operate (although they do not take into account the tax rate of the other affiliated companies when analysing PS between a subsidiary and its respective parent company, 9 either). Moreover, their measure considers the opportunity for this activity to exist between the different affiliated companies by weighting the tax rates of the countries where they are situated by the level of real economic activity of the affiliates within their borders.…”
Section: Spanish Subsidiary Companiesmentioning
confidence: 99%