A Comparison of Incumbency Across Institutions: A Look at the House, Senate, and Governorships

Abstract

<jats:p>Using the American National Election Studies of 1990, 1994, and 1998, we can see that there is an incumbency advantage for governors, senators, and members of the House of Representatives. There is, however, some variability to the magnitude of the incumbency advantage. Moreover, it appears to follow a rather sensible pattern. It appears to be strongest for members of the House and weakest for Governors. When looking at House elections, we can see that incumbency is more powerful than is party identification. When we look at senatorial and gubernatorial elections, the items appear to be more evenly matched. When we look at evaluations of the national parties performance and expectations of performance, the picture becomes much more muddy. Gubernatorial candidates consistently avoid being held accountable for their national parties past economic performance. Candidates for the House and Senate are largely able to avoid responsibility for the past economic performance of their national parties. Economic expectations, however, are modestly more related to vote choice.</jats:p>