A Common Framework for Design and Safety Analyses using Formal Methods

Deneux, Johann; Åkerlund, Ove

doi:10.1007/978-0-85729-410-4_66

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 3 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The verification of safety-critical systems using formal techniques is not something new [19], as can be seen from methods such as state machine hazard analysis, which was based on Petri nets [20], and the application of model checking to safety-critical system verification based on various formal models such as finite state machines [4], Statecharts [3], Process Control Event Diagrams [28], Scade [8], and Altarica [3]. A common method for the application of model checking to safety-critical system verification is through the specification of safety-related properties using some temporal logic such as Computation Tree Logic (CTL) or Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and then checking for the satisfaction of the safety specification [15].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Model Checking Safety-Critical Systems Using Safecharts

Hsiung

Chen

Lin

2007

IEEE Trans. Comput.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-With rapid developments in science and technology, we now see the ubiquitous use of different types of safety-critical systems in our daily lives such as in avionics, consumer electronics, and medical systems. In such systems, unintentional design faults might result in injury or even death to human beings. To make sure that safety-critical systems are really safe, there is a need to verify them formally. However, the verification of such systems is getting more and more difficult because designs are becoming very complex. To cope with high design complexity, currently, model-driven architecture design is becoming a well-accepted trend. However, existing methods of testing and standards conformance are restricted to implementation code, so they do not fit very well with model-based approaches. To bridge this gap, we propose a model-based formal verification technique for safety-critical systems. In this work, the model-checking paradigm is applied to the Safecharts model, which was used for modeling but not yet used for verification. Our contributions listed are as follows: First, the safety constraints in Safecharts are mapped to semantic equivalents in timed automata for verification. Second, the theory for safety constraint verification is proven and implemented in a compositional model checker (that is, the State-Graph Manipulator (SGM)). Third, prioritized and urgent transitions are implemented in SGM to model the risk semantics in Safecharts. Finally, it is shown that the priority-based approach to mutual exclusion of resource usage in the original Safecharts is unsafe and corresponding solutions are proposed here. Application examples show the feasibility and benefits of the proposed model-driven verification of safety-critical systems.

show abstract

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Model Checking Safety-Critical Systems Using Safecharts

Hsiung

Chen

Lin

2007

IEEE Trans. Comput.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Other platforms for MBSA are based on the Altarica language and OCAS [21,22,23], on Scade [24,25], and on Statemate [26,27]. None of them is publicly available.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The xSAP Safety Analysis Platform

Bittner

Bozzano

Cavada

et al. 2016

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. This paper describes the XSAP safety analysis platform. XSAP provides several model-based safety analysis features for finite-and infinite-state synchronous transition systems. In particular, it supports library-based definition of fault modes, an automatic model extension facility, generation of safety analysis artifacts such as Dynamic Fault Trees (DFTs) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) tables. Moreover, it supports probabilistic evaluation of Fault Trees, failure propagation analysis using Timed Failure Propagation Graphs (TFPGs), and Common Cause Analysis (CCA). XSAP has been used in several industrial projects as verification back-end, and is currently being evaluated in a joint R&D Project involving FBK and The Boeing Company.

show abstract

Symbolic Fault Tree Analysis for Reactive Systems

Bozzano

Cimatti

Tapparo

Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A Common Framework for Design and Safety Analyses using Formal Methods

Cited by 5 publications

References 3 publications

Model Checking Safety-Critical Systems Using Safecharts

Model Checking Safety-Critical Systems Using Safecharts

The xSAP Safety Analysis Platform

Symbolic Fault Tree Analysis for Reactive Systems

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About