A Coherence Theory of Truth in Ethics

Dorsey, Dale

doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7828-8

Cited by 20 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Pedersen 2012b; Pedersen and Wright 2013). 4 But see also Dorsey's coherence theory of truth in the moral discourse (Dorsey 2006). some moral framework, and remaining so no matter what improvements are made to the initial framework.…”

Section: Objectivist Antirealism: Moral Truth As Stable Warrantabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Irresolvable Disagreement, Objectivist Antirealism and Logical Revision

Harth

2020

Erkenn

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Meta-ethical realism faces the serious epistemological problem of how to explain our epistemic access to moral reality. In the face of this challenge many are sceptical about non-naturalist realism. Nonetheless, there is good reason to acknowledge moral objectivity: morality shows all the signs of a truth-apt discourse but doesn't exhibit the typical relativity inducing features. This suggests a middle-ground position, a theory that embraces the virtues of realism but does avoid its vices: objectivist antirealism. In this paper, I'll discuss, mainly following Crispin Wright's account of moral truth as superassertibility, a promising version of objectivist antirealism and show how to cope with notorious problems, notably those arising from the thought that moral disagreement might be possible in which nobody is guilty of a cognitive shortcoming, which contradicts the antirealist claim that moral truth is not beyond our epistemic reach. The solution is to deny the possibility of cognitively faultless moral disagreement by arguing that cognitively blameless thinkers either agree or stay agnostic and, therefore, never disagree about any moral proposition. Since assuming an agnostic stance on the part of such thinkers contradicts the antirealist's conception of truth-even within the limits of intuitionistic logic-I'll propose an alternative logical revision for the moral discourse: a three-valued logic with epistemically construed truth-values.

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Section: Objectivist Antirealism: Moral Truth As Stable Warrantabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Irresolvable Disagreement, Objectivist Antirealism and Logical Revision

Harth

2020

Erkenn

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“…It is therefore possible that when a subject judges that a particular moral sentence is, say, “true” — as opposed to an “opinion or attitude” — she does not mean that the sentence represents a moral fact at all. Rather, she might only mean to reaffirm this sentence (deflationist theory of moral truth, see Blackburn 2000 : 79; Gibbard 2003 : x) or to express that the sentence can be part of a coherent system of sentences (coherentist theory of moral truth, see Dorsey 2006 ). On any of these latter interpretations subjects’ responses do not directly bear on the moral realism/anti-realism distinction.…”

Section: (G8) Test Subjects’ Understanding Of Moral Truth (Correctnesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Measure Moral Realism

Pölzler

2018

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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In recent years an increasing number of psychologists have begun to explore the prevalence, causes and effects of ordinary people’s intuitions about moral realism. Many of these studies have lacked in construct validity, i.e., they have failed to (fully or exclusively) measure moral realism. My aim in this paper accordingly is to motivate and guide methodological improvements. In analysis of prominent existing measures, I develop general recommendations for overcoming ten prima facie serious worries about research on folk moral realism. G1 and G2 require studies’ answer choices to be as metaethically comprehensive as methodologically feasible. G3 and G4 prevent fallacious inferences from intuitions about related debates. G5 and G6 limit first-order moral and epistemic influences. G7 address studies’ instructions. And G8 and G9 suggest tests of important psychological presuppositions.

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“…I've articulated a coherence theory of truth in ethics in detail elsewhere (Dorsey 2006), and so won't explore all the nooks and crannies of this view here. The coherence theory really consists of two crucial definitions: truth and coherence.…”

Section: The Coherence Theory Brieflymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7. Pluralism of this kind has been the subject of some criticism (e.g., Tappolet 1997); see Dorsey (2006) for a response. 8.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%