A co-design methodology for cyber-physical systems under actuator fault and cyber attack

Ye, Dan; Luo, Shengping

doi:10.1016/j.jfranklin.2019.01.009

Cited by 20 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…In addition, we can use LMI toolbox to obtain feasible solution in Eq. 11- (14). The parameters L j and F j to be obtained by…”

Section: Design Of Robust H ∞ State and Fault Estimation Observementioning

confidence: 99%

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Co-Design of Dual Security Control and Communication for Nonlinear CPS Under DoS Attack

2020

IEEE Access

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The less conservative co-design problem of dual security control and communication for CPS was studied for a class of nonlinear CPS with an actuator fault and DoS attack based on the DETCS. First, combining with the edge computing thought, data filtering and partial computing tasks were assigned to the network edge devices. The DoS attack with limited energy is converted into a special time delay; thus, the discrete event trigger condition, the actuator fault estimation and regulation, and the robustness for DoS attack can be considered uniformly. A dual security control framework of non-uniformly sampled data system was proposed under the DETCS for CPS, and the T-S fuzzy model of closed-loop nonlinear CPS with the coexistence of fault and attack was established. Second, with the help of time-delay system theory, a robust observer for state and fault estimation and the co-design method of dual security control and communication with the actuator fault and DoS attack were obtained by constructing an appropriate Lyapunov-Krasovskii function and using affine Bessel-Legendre inequality. Finally, the validity and feasibility of the theoretical results were verified by a classical quadruple-tank system. INDEX TERMS Co-design, DoS attack, dual security control, nonlinear CPS. I. INTRODUCTION Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) integrate the 3C technology of computer, communication and control, which is an intelligent system with highly integrated interaction between computing units and physical objects in the network environment [1]. Its emergence has promoted the rapid development of the aerospace, smart cities, smart grids, intelligent transportation and other fields. Furthermore, CPS realizes the information interaction for physical subsystems through various shared communication networks, so the cyber system and the physical system are deeply integrated. However, the diversified communication network in CPSs makes the system more vulnerable to external influences, including cyberattack, malicious code, data fraud, network eavesdropping and so on, which pose a serious threat to the security of the cyber system. In addition, physical system fault is another The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Juntao Fei .

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“…In addition, we can use LMI toolbox to obtain feasible solution in Eq. 11- (14). The parameters L j and F j to be obtained by…”

Section: Design Of Robust H ∞ State and Fault Estimation Observementioning

confidence: 99%

“…While the CPS is a community of the physical system and the cyber system, both are indispensable. As a result, only considering the dual security defence system of fault tolerance in the physical system and attack tolerance in the cyber system can the CPS security be ensured [14], [15]. In addition, most of the plants are nonlinear in practical engineering.…”

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confidence: 99%

Co-Design of Dual Security Control and Communication for Nonlinear CPS Under DoS Attack

2020

IEEE Access

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“…In this paper, the main concern is to develop an accurate actuator fault detection scheme and a corresponding actuator fault estimation strategy with respect to the cyber-physical systems. Therefore, based on the signal transmit structure proposed in [16], the states of the physical layer and the cyber layer are known to each other for simplicity.…”

Section: Problem Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed fault detection and estimation in cyber–physical systems subject to actuator faults

Zhu

Zhou

et al. 2020

ISA Transactions

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“…In order to address concerns related to control components, resilient control designs based on state estimates have been proposed for detecting and preventing attacks in works such as Ding et al (2020) and Cárdenas et al (2011), wherein the latter cyberattack-resilient control frameworks compare state estimates based on models of the physical process and state measurements to detect cyberattacks. Ye and Luo (2019) address a scenario where actuator faults and cyberattacks on sensors or actuators occur simultaneously by using a control policy based on the Lyapunov theory and adaptation and Nussbaum-type functions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lyapunov-Based Economic Model Predictive Control for Detecting and Handling Actuator and Simultaneous Sensor/Actuator Cyberattacks on Process Control Systems

Oyama

Messina²,

Rangan³

et al. 2022

Front. Chem. Eng.

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The controllers for a cyber-physical system may be impacted by sensor measurement cyberattacks, actuator signal cyberattacks, or both types of attacks. Prior work in our group has developed a theory for handling cyberattacks on process sensors. However, sensor and actuator cyberattacks have a different character from one another. Specifically, sensor measurement attacks prevent proper inputs from being applied to the process by manipulating the measurements that the controller receives, so that the control law plays a role in the impact of a given sensor measurement cyberattack on a process. In contrast, actuator signal attacks prevent proper inputs from being applied to a process by bypassing the control law to cause the actuators to apply undesirable control actions. Despite these differences, this manuscript shows that we can extend and combine strategies for handling sensor cyberattacks from our prior work to handle attacks on actuators and to handle cases where sensor and actuator attacks occur at the same time. These strategies for cyberattack-handling and detection are based on the Lyapunov-based economic model predictive control (LEMPC) and nonlinear systems theory. We first review our prior work on sensor measurement cyberattacks, providing several new insights regarding the methods. We then discuss how those methods can be extended to handle attacks on actuator signals and then how the strategies for handling sensor and actuator attacks individually can be combined to produce a strategy that is able to guarantee safety when attacks are not detected, even if both types of attacks are occurring at once. We also demonstrate that the other combinations of the sensor and actuator attack-handling strategies cannot achieve this same effect. Subsequently, we provide a mathematical characterization of the “discoverability” of cyberattacks that enables us to consider the various strategies for cyberattack detection presented in a more general context. We conclude by presenting a reactor example that showcases the aspects of designing LEMPC.

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A co-design methodology for cyber-physical systems under actuator fault and cyber attack

Cited by 20 publications

References 34 publications

Co-Design of Dual Security Control and Communication for Nonlinear CPS Under DoS Attack

Co-Design of Dual Security Control and Communication for Nonlinear CPS Under DoS Attack

Distributed fault detection and estimation in cyber–physical systems subject to actuator faults

Lyapunov-Based Economic Model Predictive Control for Detecting and Handling Actuator and Simultaneous Sensor/Actuator Cyberattacks on Process Control Systems

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