A Closer Look at Leibniz's Alleged Reduction of Relations*

Kulstad, Mark

doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1980.tb01396.x

Cited by 54 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…6. For sophisticated developments of the relational accident interpretation, see Kenneth Clatterbaugh (1973), Mark Kulstad (1980), laurence B. McCullough (1996 and Dennis plaisted (2002). See also Della Rocca (2012a: 146-147). (4) "if x is F, then the state of being F must be due to, explained by, x's nature alone."…”

Section: A Rationalist Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…8. For discussion of this point, see especially Kulstad (1980) and J. a. Cover and John O'leary-Hawthorne (1999: 58-86).…”

Section: A Rationalist Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…15. See, for example, Cover and O'leary-Hawthorne (1999: 58-86), Jaakko Hintikka (1972), Hidé ishiguro (1990), anja Jauernig (2010), Kulstad (1980), Benson Mates (1986), McCullough (1996), Mugnai (1992), plaisted (2002, Nicholas Rescher (1981), Bertrand Russell (1900).…”

Section: Leibniz On Relations and A Way Outmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…16. For development of this line of interpretation, see especially Kulstad (1980). For criticism of the relational accident view as an interpretation of leibniz see especially Mugnai (1992;, and Cover and O'leary-Hawthorne (1999: 58-86); see also Cover (2004: 99-108).…”

Section: Leibniz On Relations and A Way Outmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists

McDonough¹

2015

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

in a stimulating recent paper, "violations of the principle of Sufficient Reason (in leibniz and Spinoza)," Michael Della Rocca argues that rationalists face a daunting dilemma: either abandon the principle of Sufficient Reason or embrace a radical, parmenidian-style monism. The present paper argues that neither historical nor contemporary rationalists need be afraid of Della Rocca's dilemma. The second section reconstructs Della Rocca's argument in five steps. The third section argues that leibniz's treatment of relations undermines one of those steps in particular and thus provides him-as well as contemporary rationalists-with a way out. The fourth section argues that a similar way out is available to Spinoza, and that it's a better way out than either of the two options Della Rocca offers on Spinoza's behalf. The essay concludes with an historically-minded suggestion for those eager to revitalize the once-again popular notion of grounding.

show abstract

Section: A Rationalist Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…8. For discussion of this point, see especially Kulstad (1980) and J. a. Cover and John O'leary-Hawthorne (1999: 58-86).…”

Section: A Rationalist Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Leibniz On Relations and A Way Outmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Leibniz On Relations and A Way Outmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists

McDonough¹

2015

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…24 For instance, Mates (1986, 216), Burdick (1991, 9-11), Cover and O'Leary-Hawthorne (1999, 84-85). 25 Advocated by Ishiguro (1972), Clatterbaugh (1973, 65-73), D'Agostino (1976, Kulstad (1980), Wong (1980), andMcCullough (1996, 172-176). (Ishiguro has revised, to some extent, her position in Ishiguro 1990, Ch.…”

Section: The Merits Of Soft Reductionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leibnizian Soft Reduction of Extrinsic Denominations and Relations

Maunu¹

2004

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Leibniz, it seems, wishes to reduce statements involving relations or extrinsic denominations to ones solely in terms of individual accidents or, respectively, intrinsic denominations. His reasons for this appear to be that relations are merely mental things (since they cannot be individual accidents) and that extrinsic denominations do not represent substances as they are on their own. Three interpretations of Leibniz's reductionism may be distinguished: First, he allowed only monadic predicates in reducing statements (hard reductionism); second, he allowed also 'implicitly relational predicates' such as 'loves somebody' (soft reductionism); third, he allowed also 'explicitly relational predicates' such as 'loves Helen' (nonreductionism). Hard reductionism is problematic with respect to Leibniz's doctrines of universal expression and incompossibility (among other things). Nonreductionism, in turn, faces insurmountable problems with Leibniz's doctrine of self-sufficiency and internal identification of substances, as well as with that of individual accidents. The remaining option, soft reductionism, standing between the other two interpretations, arguably avoids at least some of their problems.

show abstract

Russell and Leibniz on the Classification of Propositions

Griffin

2012

New Essays on Leibniz Reception

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A Closer Look at Leibniz's Alleged Reduction of Relations*

Cited by 54 publications

References 0 publications

Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists

Leibniz, Spinoza and an Alleged Dilemma for Rationalists

Leibnizian Soft Reduction of Extrinsic Denominations and Relations

Russell and Leibniz on the Classification of Propositions

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About