A choice-semantical approach to theoretical truth

Abstract

A central topic in the logic of science concerns the proper semantic analysis of theoretical sentences, that is sentences containing theoretical terms. In this paper, we present a novel choice-semantical account of theoretical truth based on the epsilon-term definition of theoretical terms. Specifically, we develop two ways of specifying the truth conditions of theoretical statements in a choice functional semantics, each giving rise to a corresponding logic of such statements. In order to investigate the inferential strength of these logical systems, we provide a translation of each truth definition into a modal definition of theoretical truth. Based on this, we show that the stronger notion of choice-semantical truth captures more adequately our informal semantic understanding of scientific statements.

Modal Structuralism with Theoretical Terms

“… 2 The former problem is addressed in Carnap ( 1961 ), where he uses Hilbert’s -operator for expressing that the Carnap sentence yields only an indefinite description of theoretical terms. For a translation of the present semantics of theoretical terms into the language of the epsilon operator, see Andreas and Schiemer ( 2016 ). …”

“…See, e.g., the choice-semantics for mathematical terms outlined in Schiemer and Gratzl ( 2016 ) or a Ramsey semantics developed recently in Leitgeb ( 2020 ). For the equivalence of the choice semantics and the modal approach discussed in the present paper, see Andreas and Schiemer ( 2016 ).…”