2014
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2483221
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A Catch-22 in Audit Litigation? Interventions that Decrease Assessed Auditor Culpability by Reducing Assessed Fraud Detectability and Auditor Acquiescence Generate Reactance Effects that Increase Assessed Damages

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Cited by 32 publications
(38 citation statements)
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“…There is some early evidence regarding the effect of a KAM section within the three following domains: Auditor liability (Backof, Bowlin, and Goodson 2014;Brasel, Doxey, Grenier, and Reffett 2016;Brown, Majors, and Peecher 2015;Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski 2016a;Kachelmeier, Schmidt, and Valentine 2015), aggregated capital market reactions (Lennox, Schmidt, and Thompson 2016), and individual investors' decisions or assessments (Christensen, Glover, and Wolfe 2014;1 Köhler, Ratzinger-Sakel, and Theis 2016). The preliminary behavioral evidence concerning the studies on auditor liability suggest that KAM sections regarding subsequent litigation either reduce or do not influence auditor liability.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is some early evidence regarding the effect of a KAM section within the three following domains: Auditor liability (Backof, Bowlin, and Goodson 2014;Brasel, Doxey, Grenier, and Reffett 2016;Brown, Majors, and Peecher 2015;Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski 2016a;Kachelmeier, Schmidt, and Valentine 2015), aggregated capital market reactions (Lennox, Schmidt, and Thompson 2016), and individual investors' decisions or assessments (Christensen, Glover, and Wolfe 2014;1 Köhler, Ratzinger-Sakel, and Theis 2016). The preliminary behavioral evidence concerning the studies on auditor liability suggest that KAM sections regarding subsequent litigation either reduce or do not influence auditor liability.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although these results, coupled with results in contemporaneous studies (Brown, Majors, and Peecher 2015;Kachelmeier, Schmidt, and Valentine 2015) should provide standard setters with a degree of comfort that disclosing CAMs will not increase auditor liability, there undoubtedly are exceptions that future research should examine to further inform policymakers. For example, two contemporary studies report that, in certain situations, disclosing CAMs can increase jurors' judgments of auditor liability such as when misstatements pertain to violations of rules-based/bright line standards (Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski 2016) and/or when the concept of reasonable assurance is not explained to jurors (Backof, Bowlin, and Goodson 2015).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…Gimbar, Hasen, and Ozlanski (2016) argue that these changes have a significant impact in terms of increasing the auditor's responsibility and should lead auditors to increase the value of their auditing work, since they will have to expand the auditing procedures for risk minimization. Brown et al (2014) state that the auditor's responsibility is reduced when a disclosed KAM is related to a topic in which fraud had been found at some previous moment.…”
Section: New Audit Report and Independent Auditmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This paper stands out from the studies already carried out on the subject, since it analyzes the market's behavior on receiving particular information. Most of the studies have focused on KAMs and their impacts on the auditor's responsibility, while those that have analyzed their informational relevance have been based on questionnaires mostly applied to a non-investor public (Brown, Majors & Peecher, 2014;Brasel, Doxey, Grenier & Reffett, 2016;Christensen, Glover & Wolfe, 2014). In a recent study, Sirois, Bédard, and Bera (2018) investigated how the adoption of KAMs affects the attention of financial statement users, using an eye-tracking system in an experiment with post-graduate accounting students.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%