A case study on threat assessment: Learning critical lessons to prevent school violence.

Abstract

This qualitative case study examines the way school officials implemented the U.S. Secret Service and Department of Education’s principles for threat assessment with a specific student of concern, who underwent a threat assessment and later shot and killed a classmate and himself on school grounds. The data came from deposition testimony from 12 school and district staff familiar with the student and the case and more than 8,000 pages of school, district, and law enforcement records. The findings suggest that district and school officials need to monitor the implementation of the threat assessment process with students of concern. Specifically, the threat assessment team should include 4 to 5 members from multidisciplinary perspectives; team members should complete a comprehensive threat assessment training program; threat assessed students should receive regular check-ins and support; and districts and schools should use an empirically validated threat assessment tool. Finally, educators should consider relying on a continuous improvement model to monitor implementation of threat assessment principles and procedures.

Learning from a failure in threat assessment: 11 questions and not enough answers

“…In the US, school districts use these questions to train school staff on how to conduct a threat assessment and to develop district‐specific threat assessment screening tools (Augustyniak, ). In this case, the school district recognized the Secret Service and Department of Education's threat assessment guidelines as providing a critical foundation for school staff (see Goodrum et al, ) (District Official #1, p. 78). In fact, the district's “Threat Assessment and Action Plan” form noted, “This screening form was developed by [Name Withheld] Public Schools with information adapted from the US Department of Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Education…” (Goodrum et al, ).…”

“…In this case, the school district recognized the Secret Service and Department of Education's threat assessment guidelines as providing a critical foundation for school staff (see Goodrum et al, ) (District Official #1, p. 78). In fact, the district's “Threat Assessment and Action Plan” form noted, “This screening form was developed by [Name Withheld] Public Schools with information adapted from the US Department of Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Education…” (Goodrum et al, ). The Secret Service recommends that teams conduct the student interview after it has gathered information from multiple sources about the student's threat, communications, weapons interests, and behavior history (Fein et al, ).…”

“…While testimony from the assistant principal indicated that JD's apology to the faculty mentor weighed heavily in the assessment (Assistant Principal #1, p. 177), the evidence reveals a failure to dig deeper into that grudge. For example, a handwritten note on the threat assessment form said, “[JD] does not seem to be remorseful and understanding of [faculty mentor]’s feelings of being threatened” (see Threat Assessment Form in Goodrum et al, ). In such cases when a student gives a “mixed signal,” the compensatory behavior (apologizing) may be given too much weight (Fox & Harding, ).…”

“…In the US, school districts use these questions to train school staff on how to conduct a threat assessment and to develop district-specific threat assessment screening tools (Augustyniak, 2005). In this case, the school district recognized the Secret Service and Department of Education's threat assessment guidelines as providing a critical foundation for school staff (see Goodrum et al, 2018) (Goodrum et al, 2018). The Secret Service recommends that teams conduct the student interview after it has gathered information from multiple sources about the student's threat, communications, weapons interests, and behavior history (Fein et al, 2004).…”

“…The premeditated nature of these attacks, as well as perpetrators' tendency to leak their plans, means that we have opportunities to intervene. Unfortunately, law enforcement investigations and case studies on school shootings consistently reveal that different school staff and classmates had numerous pieces of concerning information about the attacker prior to the tragedy, but not one staff member or classmate had all of the information, inhibiting their ability to evaluate the risk posed (Fox & Harding, ; Goodrum et al, ; Goodrum, Thompson, Ward, & Woodward, ; Virginia Tech Review Panel, ). The fragmentation of knowledge about students of concern across various staff (e.g., administrators, teachers, campus security, coaches) may obscure the ability of school officials to adequately evaluate the level of threat an individual poses (Goodrum et al, ).…”