A Case of Greenlandic Fisheries Co-Politics: Power and Participation in Total Allowable Catch Policy-Making

Abstract

Greenlandic governance institutions have been criticised for their colonial heritage of centralisation and lack of democratic participation. In the same manner, Greenlandic fisheries management is notorious in the academic literature for its centralised and locally illegitimate character. While recognising the lack of localised co-management fisheries governance institutions in Greenland, we argue that something has yet to be said about power and user participation in the centralised institutions that have developed. From a symbolic interactionist perspective we dissect the centralised institutions in terms of a differentiated cast of actors and their interaction and argue that participation and power come in many institutional guises as the complex cast of actors within the centralised system represent themselves and others. If we are to understand power and participation in Greenlandic fisheries governance, we need to understand the creation of alliances of the subject-positions that seek control of the self-rule fisheries governance decision-making.

Biodiversity and ecosystem services in Nordic coastal ecosystems

“…The Fishery Council consists of organisations representing the fishing companies and the commercial fishers and hunters. The Employers' Association of Greenland (GA) represents companies of the sea-going fleet, "the industry", whereas KNAPK (Association of Fishers and Hunters in Greenland) increasingly represents small-scale fishers and hunters (Jacobsen & Raakjaer, 2012). Rasmussen (2003) argues that an unequal power relation exists between the fishers/hunters and the industry.…”

“…There is a prevalent and widespread, but incorrect perception that the local coastal communities do not contribute financially to Greenlandic society. Self-rule government-owned companies thus dominate fishery policy and local communities have little input (Jacobsen & Raakjaer, 2012). The inshore fleet is mainly managed via fishing licenses within both the Individual Transferable Quota system (ITQ) and the free quota within TAC limits, also known as Olympic-style fishing whereby individual boats "race" to get as much of the TAC as possible before the fishery closes (FAO, 2016).…”

“…While there still is a long way to go before ILK from Disko Bay and Greenland is used systematically to inform management decisions, PISUNA is a huge and positive step forward. Gone are the times when local hunters and fishers would have to contact a relevant minister, the Fishery Department or GINR by phone to explain that resources were abundant and that regulations should be relaxed (Jacobsen & Raakjaer, 2012). PISUNA was at first met with considerable scepticism from both scientists and the local hunters and fishers.…”

Biodiversity and ecosystem services in Nordic coastal ecosystems

“…In the same manner, Greenlandic fisheries management is notorious in academic literature for its centralized and locally illegitimate character (Jacobsen & Raakjaer, 2012). Greenlandic governance institutions are subject to the power structures taken over from Denmark at the inception of Home Rule on May 1, 1979 (Jacobsen & Raakjaer, 2012).…”

When social sustainability becomes politics – perspectives from Greenlandic fisheries governance

“…Recent studies of Greenlandic fishery governance show that the period of 2009 to 2012 was characterised by a "new paradigm" in Greenlandic fishery governance (Jacobsen and Raakjaer 2012). In this period a discourse of "grand reform" set the agenda for reforming the coastal fisheries towards greater economic profitability (Jacobsen and Raakjaer 2014).…”