A case of avian influenza A(H5N1) in England, January 2022

Oliver, Isabel; Roberts, J.L.; Brown, Colin; Byrne, Alexander M. P.; Mellon, Dominic; Hansen, Rowena; Banyard, Ashley C.; James, Joe; Donati, Matthew; Porter, R.; Ellis, Joanna; Cogdale, Jade; Lackenby, Angie; Chand, Meera; Dabrera, Gavin; Brown, Ian H.; Zambon, Maria

doi:10.2807/1560-7917.es.2022.27.5.2200061

Cited by 47 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…In 2014, clade 2.3.4.4a spread from Asia to Europe and North America, while in 2016 clade 2.3.4.4b spread from Asia to Europe and Africa [ 4 , 5 ]. In addition to the high mortality in domestic and wild birds, the virus succeeded to jump species barriers and infected mammals including humans, foxes and seals in several countries [ 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ]. Therefore, it is paramount to efficiently control the virus in poultry to limit bird-to-human transmission [ 10 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Isolation of Genetically Diverse H5N8 Avian Influenza Viruses in Poultry in Egypt, 2019–2021

Salaheldin

Elbestawy

Abdelkader

et al. 2022

Viruses

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The global spread of avian influenza virus (AIV) of clade 2.3.4.4b since 2016 has caused severe losses in wild birds and poultry and has posed a risk for the infection of mammals including humans. The vaccination of poultry has been used to limit the spread of the virus and mitigate its socioeconomic impact. Here, we describe H5N8 epidemics in chickens, turkeys and ducks from different localities in Egypt from 2019 to 2021. About 41.7% (n = 88/211) flocks were tested positive by RT-qPCR for H5N8 viruses with prevalence rates of 45.1% (n = 65/144) and 34.3% (n = 23/67) in vaccinated and non-vaccinated flocks, respectively. A sequence analysis of the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes indicated not only the multiple introduction events of H5N8 viruses in Egypt but also the establishment of endemic viruses in commercial poultry in 2020/2021. The recent H5N8 viruses in poultry in Egypt are genetically distinct from the majority of licensed vaccines used in the field. Together, our findings indicate that poultry in Egypt is an endemic center for clade 2.3.4.4b in the Middle East. The efficiency of current vaccines should be regularly evaluated and updated to fully protect poultry flocks in Egypt against H5N8 viruses.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Isolation of Genetically Diverse H5N8 Avian Influenza Viruses in Poultry in Egypt, 2019–2021

Salaheldin

Elbestawy

Abdelkader

et al. 2022

Viruses

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“…In the same period, transmission of HPAI H5 viruses to humans, and other wild mammals, have been reported both in Europe, Asia and North America. 3 of 6 zoonotic cases have been caused by Gs/GD HPAI H5 viruses with a BTN3A3 resistant genotype (Table S5) 51 , providing opportunities for further virus adaptation to humans.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Zoonotic avian influenza viruses evade human BTN3A3 restriction

Pinto

Bakshi

Lytras

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Cross-species transmission of avian influenza A viruses (IAVs) into humans could represent the first step of a future pandemic1. Multiple factors limiting the spillover and adaptation of avian IAVs in humans have been identified, but they are not sufficient to explain which virus lineages are more likely to cross the species barrier1,2. Here, we identified human BTN3A33 (butyrophilin subfamily 3 member A3) as a potent inhibitor of avian but not human IAVs. We determined that BTN3A3 is constitutively expressed in human airways and its antiviral activity evolved in primates. We show that BTN3A3 restriction acts at the early stages of virus replication by inhibiting avian IAV vRNA transcription. We identified residue 313 in the viral nucleoprotein (NP) as the genetic determinant of BTN3A3 sensitivity (313F, or rarely 313L in avian viruses) or evasion (313Y or 313V in human viruses). However, several serotypes of avian IAVs that spilled over into humans in recent decades evade BTN3A3 restriction. In these cases, BTN3A3 evasion is due to substitutions (N, H or Q) in NP residue 52 that is adjacent to residue 313 in the NP structure4. Importantly, we identified more than 150 avian IAV lineages with a BTN3A3-resistant genotype. In conclusion, sensitivity or resistance to BTN3A3 is another factor to consider in the risk assessment of the zoonotic potential of avian influenza viruses.

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“…In addition, these findings demonstrate that targeted IAV surveillance in wild bird populations can detect newly introduced or emergent IAV viruses prior to spillover to domestic poultry. Advanced warnings from wild bird surveillance allow poultry producers to consider altering biosecurity in the face of increased IAV risk and also help inform zoonotic disease potential (15).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%