A Call Conference Room Interception Attack and Its Detection

A Study of Ten Popular Android Mobile VoIP Applications: Are the Communications Encrypted?

“…Such interception is possible as long as the attacker knows the IP address and phone number of the caller [12]. Vrakas, Geneiatakis and Lambrinoudakis [10] demonstrated how an internal user can exploit the SIP REFER method using a MITM attack. Interception techniques involving more than one MITM attacks include Call Hijacking attack.…”

“…The latter can be categorized into Call Establishment hijacking, Call Termination hijacking and Call Forwarding hijacking [13] (see Table 1). Zhang, Wang, Yang and Jiang [13] explained that Call Establishment hijacking can be achieved by two MITM attackers [10] or external attacker who knows the IP address of the target SIP phone can initiate the attack [11,12] Call Establishment hijacking Two MITM attackers manipulate the call establishment. As a result, the caller thinks the callee is busy, but the callee is unaware of the incoming call [13] Call Termination hijacking Prolongs the duration of established calls by hijacking the normal call termination [13] Call Forwarding hijacking Allows an unanswered incoming call to be forwarded to another phone number [13] P2PSIP…”

Potential Applications of IPsec in Next Generation Networks

“…While encrypting the traffic with IPsec is a good security practice, applying this practice to VoIP or Video traffic, sensitive to delays and latencies, poses a number of efficiency challenges. This is when the IKE capabilities come into play; IPsec provides key exchange functionality for SIP negotiation, so that the IMS voice and video traffic is to be protected (RFC4475, 2006;Vrakas, 2010;Wang, 2009). While reviewing the role and capabilities of the IPsec, as well as its possible applications in the next generation architectures, this paper also identifies some of the challenges and limitations this framework faces in the NGN context: mobile IP and mobility management, resistance to denial of service attacks, multimedia protocols, IPv6 control protocols and so on.…”

Enhancing security and privacy in VoIP/IMS environments

“…An attack where a malicious user can exploit a vulnerability of the SIP signaling in order to intercept a conference room is described in [37]. The development of a cross-layer mechanism that prevents these attacks is also presented.…”

“…Note that the resource to be accessed, is identified by the corresponding URI included in the SIP "Refer-To" header and can be any type of existing URIs such as SIP and HTTP. A malicious user can avail of this request by inviting himself or another UE of his choice to participate (illegally) in the session [37]. In this case the attacker spoofs a legitimate REFER request of a valid user by adding his UE's URI/public ID in the "Refer-To" or "To" header, depending on the type of conference invitation.…”