A Budget Feasible Mechanism for Hiring Doctors in E-Healthcare

Abstract

Throughout the past decade, there has been an extensive research on scheduling the hospital resources such as the operation theatre(s) (OTs) and the experts (such as nurses, doctors etc.) inside the hospitals. With the technological growth, mainly advancement in communication media (such as smart phones, video conferencing, smart watches etc.) one may think of taking the expertise by the doctors (distributed around the globe) from outside the in-house hospitals. Earlier this interesting situation of hiring doctors from outside the hospitals has been studied from monetary (with patient having infinite budget) and non-monetary perspectives in strategic setting. In this paper, the more realistic situation is studied in terms of hiring the doctors from outside the hospital when a patient is constrained by budget. Our proposed mechanisms follow the two pass mechanism design framework each consisting of allocation rule and payment rule. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanisms.

A budget feasible peer graded mechanism for iot-based crowdsourcing

“…In this paper, we have carefully crafted a truthful budget feasible mechanism for the task allocation problem (TUBE-TAP) motivated by [21] [22], that also allow us to have the true information about the quality of the IoT devices 2 .…”

A mechanism design framework for hiring experts in e-healthcare

“…is utilized to take the expertise of the doctors from outside the admitted hospitals in non-strategic setting. In (Singh et al 2015(Singh et al , 2018b the strategic case is considered and is solved using mechanism design with money and in (Singh et al 2018a(Singh et al , 2017 mechanism design without money is utilized. For the full version of (Singh et al 2018b) and (Singh et al 2018a) one can go through (Singh and Mukhopadhyay 2016b) and (Singh and Mukhopadhyay 2016a) respectively.…”

“…Considering the positive budget case, in (Singh et al 2018b) the set-up with single patient and multiple experts with the constraint that patient have some positive budget, is considered. A non-truthful and truthful budget feasible mechanisms are proposed motivated by (Singer 2012(Singer , 2010Khuller et al 1999) for allocating experts to a patient.…”

“…The more realistic version of the problem could be, to have multiple patients and multiple doctors, with the constraints that (1) each of the patient has some positive budget for the purpose of having expertise from outside of the admitted hospital, (2) the experts may have some preferred time slot (or availability time) for imparting the consultancy. In this paper, this generalized version of the problem is investigated and the non-truthful and truthful mechanisms are proposed motivated by (Singer 2012(Singer , 2010Singh et al 2018b;Khuller et al 1999).…”