A Brief History of the Soul

Goetz, Stewart; Taliaferro, Charles

doi:10.1002/9781444395938

Cited by 45 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…Unlike Plato, Aristotle suggested in De anima that the soul cannot be separated from the body but rather viewed man as a soul-body composite. His theory of movement was that the soul chooses to act, affirming Plato's notion of mental-tophysical causation (Goetz and Taliaferro, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Plato viewed the soul as synonymous with the mind, and felt that the soul was immortal, separate from the body, and capable of being reincarnated. He thought reason and intellect were the essence of the soul, which moved the body by setting itself in motion (Goetz and Taliaferro, 2011). [Mind is a term used by phenomenalists such David Hume, who wanted to avoid the supernatural resonances of the word "soul."…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Philosophy of mind: Coming to terms with traumatic brain injury

Buzan

Kupfer

Eastridge

et al. 2014

NRE

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INTRODUCTION: Patients and their families struggle with accepting changes in personality after traumatic brain injury (TBI). A neuroanatomic understanding may assist with this process. OBJECTIVES: We briefly review the history of the Western conceptualization of the Self, and discuss how neuroscience and changes in personality wrought by brain injuries modify and enrich our understanding of our selves and our patients. CONCLUSION: The sense of self, while conflated with the concept of a "soul" in Western thinking, is more rationally considered a construct derived from neurophysiologic structures. The self or personality therefore often changes when the brain changes. A neuroanatomic perspective can help patients, families, and clinicians accept and cope with the sequellae of TBI. bases of affect, morality, empathy, and sense of self. We discuss embodiment theory and briefly describe an exocentric model as one possible way to reframe our understanding of "mind" and "body". Rethinking these issues -modifying and expanding one's "philosophy of mind" -can help patients, family members, and clinicians accept and more effectively respond to brain injury. A brief historical review of the early western theory of mind: The struggle toward a physical systemAs stated in one text on Philosophy of Mind, this branch of philosophy explores the relationship between mind, brain, and body and between the mental and the physical (Chalmers, 2002, p. xi). Philosophers attempt

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of mind: Coming to terms with traumatic brain injury

Buzan

Kupfer

Eastridge

et al. 2014

NRE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As Brian Leftow (1991: 187) has pointed out, here Anselm relies on the more general tenet that an immediate cause is present to or located where its effect is located, where and when the effect exists/occurs (assuming, of course, that the effect has a location in space and time). 25 Anselm goes so far as to say, "...since nothing at all exists without him, if he exists nowhere and never, then every good thing exists nowhere and never, and absolutely everything exists nowhere and never. Just how false that is, there is no need to say" (2007: 28).…”

Section: Anselmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Omnipresence and the Location of the Immaterial

Inman¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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I first offer a broad taxonomy of models of divine omnipresence in the Christian tradition, both past and present. I then examine the recent model proposed by Hud Hudson (2009Hudson ( , 2014 and Alexander Pruss (2013)-ubiquitous entension-and flag a worry with their account that stems from predominant analyses of the concept of 'material object'. I then attempt to show that ubiquitous entension has a rich Latin medieval precedent in the work of Augusine and Anselm. I argue that the model of omnipresence explicated by Augustine and Anselm has the resources to avoid the noted worry by offering an alternative account of the divide between the immaterial and the material. I conclude by considering a few alternative analyses of 'material object' that make conceptual room for a contemporary Christian theist to follow suite in thinking that at least some immaterial entities are literally spatially located when relating to the denizens of spacetime.At the heart of many a theistic metaphysic is the view that an exhaustive inventory of reality consists of both material and immaterial entities, and that these two domains interact in some way or other. There is, however, surprisingly little discussion at the intersection of contemporary metaphysics and philosophical theology concerning the precise nature and relationship between the material and the immaterial and its bearing on Christian theology.This was not always the case. Medieval philosophical reflection was replete with discussion on the nature of the relationship between God, angels, and the human soul and the material domain. In fact, according to Robert Pasnau (2011a), the medieval scholastics were largely in agreement that immaterial entities, though lacking in material content are, strictly speaking, spatially located or present in some sense or other when relating to material reality. The question that preoccupied medieval philosophical theologians, then, was not whether such entities were spatially located or present in their dealings with material beings, but rather, how they were located as such. This, of course, assumes an understanding of the material-immaterial divide that is largely foreign to the contemporary context. Yet it is one that is both philosophically interesting, theologically fruitful, and by my lights worthy of serious consideration once again. * For a representative writing sample please consult the introduction, §2, and §4.

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“…There are both classical and contemporary arguments for dualism (Goetz and Taliaferro ). One traditional argument for the soul invokes the nature of abstract thought.…”

Section: Dualism: Persons Are Souls or Have Souls As Partsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Persons, Minds, and Bodies: Christian Philosophy on the Relationship of Persons and Their Bodies, Part I

Visala

2014

Philosophy Compass

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The relationship of minds, bodies, and persons has been a central topic of debate in Western philosophy and theology. This article reviews the ongoing debates about the relationship and nature of bodies, minds, and persons among contemporary Christian analytic philosophers and theologians. The first two parts present some general theological constraints for philosophical theories of persons and describe the basic concepts used (substance, property, supervenience, and physicalism). The views themselves fall into three broad categories. Dualists think that persons are either identical with or partly constituted by non‐physical souls. On this view, there are immaterial substances and properties. Hylomorphists maintain that persons are composites of bodies and the souls that inform them. Finally, physicalists claim that there are no immaterial parts to persons. Instead, persons are composed of bodies and brains, the mental properties they have supervene on physical properties.

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A Brief History of the Soul

Cited by 45 publications

References 0 publications

Philosophy of mind: Coming to terms with traumatic brain injury

Philosophy of mind: Coming to terms with traumatic brain injury

Omnipresence and the Location of the Immaterial

Persons, Minds, and Bodies: Christian Philosophy on the Relationship of Persons and Their Bodies, Part I

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