2019
DOI: 10.1257/jep.33.3.144
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A Bridge from Monty Hall to the Hot Hand: The Principle of Restricted Choice

Abstract: We show how classic conditional probability puzzles, such as the Monty Hall problem, are intimately related to the recently discovered hot hand selection bias. We explain the connection by way of the principle of restricted choice, an intuitive inferential rule from the card game bridge, which we show is naturally quantified as the updating factor in the odds form of Bayes’s rule. We illustrate how, just as the experimental subject fails to use available information to update correctly when choosing a door in … Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Generally speaking, this pervasive phenomenon is an example of counter-intuitive effects caused by probabilistic conditioning. For example, "Berkson's bias" 39,40 arises when a biased observational procedure produces spurious negative correlations. In the original context, among those admitted to hospital due to illness, a negative correlation among potentially causative factors was observed because those with no illness (who tended to have no causative factors) were not admitted to the hospital and hence not observed.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Generally speaking, this pervasive phenomenon is an example of counter-intuitive effects caused by probabilistic conditioning. For example, "Berkson's bias" 39,40 arises when a biased observational procedure produces spurious negative correlations. In the original context, among those admitted to hospital due to illness, a negative correlation among potentially causative factors was observed because those with no illness (who tended to have no causative factors) were not admitted to the hospital and hence not observed.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These studies concluded that even though players, coaches, and fans all believed strongly in a hot-hand phenomenon, there was no convincing statistical evidence to support its existence. Instead, Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985) attributed beliefs in a hot hand to a psychological tendency to see patterns in random data; an explanation that has also been proposed for behavioral anomalies in various non-sports contexts, such as financial markets and gambling (Miller and Sanjurjo 2018). Contrary to these findings, recent papers by Miller andSanjurjo (2018, 2019) demonstrate that the statistical methods used in the original studies were biased, and when their data is re-analyzed after correcting for the bias, strong evidence for a hot hand emerges.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Generally speaking, this pervasive phenomenon is an example of counter-intuitive effects caused by probabilistic conditioning. For example, "Berkson's paradox" [66,67] arises when a biased observational procedure produces spurious negative correlations. In the original context, among those admitted to hospital due to illness, a negative correlation among potentially causative factors was observed because those with no illness (who tended to have no causative factors) were not admitted to the hospital and hence not observed.…”
Section: Selection X Ymentioning
confidence: 99%