A Bond-Selling Extravaganza of the 1920's

Rippy, J. Fred

doi:10.1086/232972

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…However, as Lewis (1938) aggregated fees across different underwriters and sometimes interpolated the data, we had to start from scratch and use the primary source (the Senate Committee on Finance) in order to obtain bond-level information on underwriting fees. For a few bonds, which were not covered by the Senate Committee on Finance, we were able to obtain information from Kuczynski (1932) and Rippy (1950). After matching our 322 bonds with the list of securities for which we were able to obtain fees, we obtained a dataset of 249 securities.…”

Section: Iiia Data Collectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As defaults spread and governments were toppled, successor regimes sued earlier rulers and this gave much publicity to the terms of the loans. In the case of Peru, the former president Augusto Leguia and his son Juan Leguia were trialed for illegal enrichment (see Senate Committee on Finance, p. 1279-80, andRippy, 1950).…”

Section: Iiia Data Collectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1268-1272, Kamm, 1952, and Rippy, 1950. Many observers argued that the problem was particularly serious for the so-called security affiliates of commercial banks which were often accused to push bonds on the depositors of their parent banks.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Conflicts of Interest, Reputation, and the Interwar Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck?

Flandreau

Gaillard²,

Panizza

2010

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper builds a new dataset with detailed information on the universe of foreign government bonds issued in New York in the 1920s and uses these data to describe the behavior of the financial intermediaries which operated in the New York market during the period leading to the interwar debt crisis. The paper starts by showing that concerns over reputation played an important role in intermediaries' underwriting choices. Next, the paper checks whether banks managed to charge abnormal underwriting fees on bonds that would eventually default and finds no evidence of such practice (-banksterism‖). The paper concludes by discussing some parallels between the experience of the 1920s and the current debate on the "originate and distribute" model. © The Authors. All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be reproduced without the permission of the authors. 1 We thank, without implications, Barry Eichengreen, Mitu Gulati, Eric Hilt, and Mira Wilkins for helpful comments. We are also grateful to the curators of the Morgan Library in New York City for having given us unlimited access to JP Morgan's Syndicate Books as well as the librarians at the Graduate Institute and at the United Nations, Geneva, for patience and support. The views expressed in this paper are the authors' only and need not reflect, and should not be represented as, the views of the United Nations. AbstractThis paper builds a new dataset with detailed information on the universe of foreign government bonds issued in New York in the 1920s and uses these data to describe the behavior of the financial intermediaries which operated in the New York market during the period leading to the interwar debt crisis. The paper starts by showing that concerns over reputation played an important role in intermediaries' underwriting choices. Next, the paper checks whether banks managed to charge abnormal underwriting fees on bonds that would eventually default and finds no evidence of such practice (-banksterism‖). The paper concludes by discussing some parallels between the experience of the 1920s and the current debate on the "originate and distribute" model.

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Section: Iiia Data Collectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Iiia Data Collectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conflicts of Interest, Reputation, and the Interwar Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck?

Flandreau

Gaillard²,

Panizza

2010

SSRN Journal

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“…We also mention here the contribution of business historians such asNorris (1978). 3 SeeWinkler (1933),Madden et al (1937),Lewis (1938),Morton (1939),Rippy (1950),Mintz (1951), and laterWigmore (1985),Eichengreen and Portes (1986),Eichengreen (1989). 3 SeeWinkler (1933),Madden et al (1937),Lewis (1938),Morton (1939),Rippy (1950),Mintz (1951), and laterWigmore (1985),Eichengreen and Portes (1986),Eichengreen (1989).…”

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confidence: 99%