A Blockchain-Based Sealed-Bid e-Auction Scheme with Smart Contract and Zero-Knowledge Proof

Li, Honglei; Xue, Weilian

doi:10.1155/2021/5523394

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…As can be seen from Fig. 7, compared with the anonymous communication based electronic auction protocol [32] and blockchain-based electronic auction protocol [33], the first price sealed electronic auction protocol proposed in this paper is significantly better than the two. When 40 participants are selected, the running time of our protocol does not exceed 0.5 seconds, while the running time of the other two protocols is about 1.4 seconds and 5.1 seconds respectively, so our protocol has high efficiency.…”

Section: Operation Efficiency Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 87%

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Efficient First-price Sealed E-auction Protocol Under Secure Multi-party Computational Malicious Model

Da-Wei Zhou,

Su-Zhen Cao

et al. 2024

Journal of Computers

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<p>To solve the problems of existing e-auction protocols such as semi-trustworthiness of outsourced third parties, collusive attacks among participants, unsatisfactory decentralized structure, and inability of public verification, we propose an efficient first-price sealed e-auction protocol under a secure multi-party computational malicious model. First, the protocol combines the additive homomorphism of the ElGamal cryptographic algorithm to achieve a decentralized structure and eliminate the problem of semi-trustworthiness of outsourced third parties; it uses (n, n) threshold encryption and decryption techniques to solve the problem of collusion attacks among participants and uses Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) technology to achieve public verifiability of auction results. Additionally, the protocol proposes a method to quickly find the maximum value of the data encoding, which can avoid multiple processing of confidential data and thus effectively reduce the number of communication rounds. The combination of zero-knowledge proof and ideal/realistic simulation paradigm proves that the protocol in this paper is resistant to up to n-1 party collusion attacks and satisfies the security of the secure multi-party computational malicious model. Finally, after theoretical analysis and simulation experiments, the protocol not only satisfies higher security performance but also has greater overall operational efficiency.</p> <p> </p>

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Section: Operation Efficiency Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…In this section, we select recent protocols in the field of electronic auctions [32] and [33] and compare them with the protocols in this article. The comparison results of protocol operation efficiency under different number of participants are shown in Fig.…”

Section: Operation Efficiency Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient First-price Sealed E-auction Protocol Under Secure Multi-party Computational Malicious Model

Da-Wei Zhou,

Su-Zhen Cao

et al. 2024

Journal of Computers

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“…In addition to sealed-bid auction protocols providing small or simple deposit methods [1], [8], [9], [13], [15]- [19], [27]- [29], [31], [32], recently, David et al [10] proposed FAST (Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions) with the same motivation as ours. That is, the deposit reveals information about the bid, and thus it should be hidden.…”

Section: Concurrent and Independent Workmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Such protocols are vulnerable to false bidding, meaning bidders indicate bidding prices, but do not have the money to be paid. As a countermeasure, Galal and Youssef [13] and Li et al [19] considered using a small deposit, wherein if bidding prices are false, then the deposit is automatically confiscated. However, their proposals do not affect bidders who accept such a penalty.…”

Section: B Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

Chin¹,

Emura²,

Omote³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a "fund binding" property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealedbid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides fund binding, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al,. CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.

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“…Such protocols are vulnerable to a false bidding, meaning bidders indicate bidding prices, but do not have the money to be paid. As a countermeasure, Galal and Youssef [5] and Li et al [6] considered using a small deposit, wherein if bidding prices are false, then the deposit is automatically confiscated. However, if some bidders do not care about such a penalty because of a small deposit, then their proposals do not prevent bidders from submitting a false bidding.…”

Section: Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

CHIN,

EMURA,

SATO

et al. 2024

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

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In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a "fund binding" property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to a false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides a fund binding property, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al., CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.

show abstract

A Blockchain-Based Sealed-Bid e-Auction Scheme with Smart Contract and Zero-Knowledge Proof

Cited by 8 publications

References 20 publications

Efficient First-price Sealed E-auction Protocol Under Secure Multi-party Computational Malicious Model

Efficient First-price Sealed E-auction Protocol Under Secure Multi-party Computational Malicious Model

A Sealed-bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage

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