A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups

Abstract

Little existing work has systematically examined the factors that help terrorist groups survive or contribute to their failure. State support for terrorist groups is commonly thought to be a factor that helps groups to survive. I demonstrate with newly collected data that state sponsorship is not always helpful to terrorist groups. The resources provided by sponsors increase a group's ability to maintain itself internally. However, when a group has a sponsor that provides it with safe haven, the risk of the group being forcefully eliminated by the target increases. I argue that sponsors that provide safe haven can have incentives to provide information to the target about the groups to avoid potential costs from target military operations within their territory. The key empirical findings suggest that state sponsorship is a less serious problem for target states than many previously thought.

Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity

“…Jones and Libicki (, 19) find that 40% of terrorist groups end as a result of police action . Hendrix and Young (, 8) argue that when states are especially able to gather and manage information, it “should diminish the use of terror tactics by hampering the ability of terrorist groups to mobilize and conduct attacks.” In less capable states, on the other hand, terrorist groups are more likely to survive (Young and Dugan ; Carter ) . For example, the weakness of the Colombian state has been cited as one of the chief reasons for robustness of terrorist organizations there (Waldmann ).…”

“…The lack of a relationship is surprising because some studies find religion to explain terrorist group longevity (Blomberg et al. ), although others find mixed results (Carter ). When Freedom House is used instead of Polity (see online Appendix S1), religious motivation is statistically significant, but only at the p < .10 level in Models 2–4…”

“…Of all of the studies mentioned, only two use terrorist group data with any variation over time (Blomberg et al. ; Carter ). The extant literature has a more substantial shortcoming: None of the studies of terrorist group longevity consider that terrorist groups might affect each other.…”

Transnational policing: preemption and deterrence against elusive perpetrators

“…First, while existing analyses of indirect deterrence and the like lack formal rational-choice grounds (Atzili and Pearlman 2012;Bar 2008;Carter 2012;Colby 2008;Jenkins 2002, 2004;George 2002;Heymann 2001/02;Knopf 2008Knopf , 2012Smelser and Mitchell 2002;Trager and Zagorcheva 2005/06;Whiteneck 2005;Wilner 2011), we develop a game-theoretic model to depict the strategic interaction among Defender, Proxy, and Perpetrators. In doing so, we exploit theories of deterrence, repeated games, and principal agent.…”

Al Qaeda at the Bar: Coordinating Ideologues and Mercenaries in Terrorist Organizations

“…In fact, all of the world's known terrorist groups can be placed on a continuum running from purely ideological to purely criminal. 11 Based on published memoires and internal communications, Shapiro andSiegel (2007, 2012) (Carter 2012). 8 Such conversion has been observed in terrorist groups such as the FARC (Cronin 2006) and the Abu Sayyaf (Rogers 2003).…”