A Biocentrist Strikes Back

Sterba, James P.

doi:10.5840/enviroethics19982044

Cited by 46 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…We must kill to eat and eat to live, after all, and it seems unreasonable that we would be morally impugned by our basic biological needs. Some philosophers have proposed contingency clauses whereby, given genuine trade-offs between multiple intrinsically valuable entities, necessary harms can be incurred to protect higher interests or promote the overall good (e.g., VanDeVeer 1995, Sterba 1998). This may be a useful framework for the case at hand.…”

Section: Intrinsic Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

The Ethics of Eliminating Harmful Species: The Case of the Tsetse Fly

et al. 2018

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Wildlife species harmful to humans are often targets of control and elimination programs. A contemporary example is the tsetse fly, a vector of sleeping sickness and African animal trypanosomosis. Tsetse flies have recently been targeted by a pan-African eradication campaign. If it is successful, the campaign could push the entire tsetse family to extinction. With the emergence of effective and efficient elimination technologies, ethical assessment of proposed elimination campaigns is urgently needed. We examine the ethics of tsetse fly elimination by considering arguments predicated on both the instrumental and the intrinsic values of the species at local and global scales. We conclude that, although global eradication of tsetse flies is not ethically justified, localized elimination campaigns targeting isolated populations are ethically defensible. We urge assessments of this kind be conducted regularly and in context, so that all relevant factors underlying decisions on species elimination are routinely laid bare for evaluation.

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Section: Intrinsic Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

The Ethics of Eliminating Harmful Species: The Case of the Tsetse Fly

et al. 2018

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“…xvi Similarly, (Sterba 1995) argues that species may benefit from the death of their weaker members.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…xix Taylor advances a series of priority principles but other biocentrists offer fewer or none at all. See, for instance: (Schweitzer 1923;Sterba 1995;Taylor 1986).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The anthropocentric advantage? Environmental ethics and climate change policy

Hassoun

2011

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

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Environmental ethicists often criticize liberalism. For, many liberals embrace anthropocentric theories on which only humans have non-instrumental value. Environmental ethicists argue that such liberals fail to account for many things that matter or provide an ethic sufficient for addressing climate change. These critics suggest that many parts of nature-non-human individuals, other species, ecosystems and the biosphere have a kind of value beyond what they contribute to human freedom (or other things of value). This article suggests, however, that if environmental ethics are inclusive and also entail that concern for some parts of nature does not always trump concern for others, they have a different problem. For, when there are many things of value, figuring out what to do can be extremely difficult. Even though climate change is likely to cause problems for many parts of nature it will probably be good for some other parts. Inclusive environmental ethicists need a theory taking all of the things they care about into account to provide definitive reason even to address climate change. Without this theory, anthropocentric liberals might argue that we should not accept an inclusive environmental ethic. Although there may be something wrong with this line of thought, it at least raises a puzzle for those inclined to accept these ethics.

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“…Biocentrism loses not only its historical but also its semantic specificity: bios, life, is now used interchangeably with oikos, house or dwelling, such that both Greek concepts are presumably situated at the center of two completely overlapping circles. 4 There is nothing uncanny left in life, so long as we equalize living beings by recognizing, at least in principle (Sterba 1998), their mutually commensurate "intrinsic values." Deep ecologists finally find themselves at home in life, mapped onto a homogeneous and non-striated axiological grid, permitting the soulless spirit of objectivity to slip into our thinking through the backdoor.…”

Section: The Biocentric Paradigmmentioning

confidence: 99%

For a Phytocentrism to Come

Marder¹

2014

Environmental Philosophy

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The present essay formulates a phytocentric alternative to the biocentric and zoocentric critiques of anthropocentrism. Treating phuton-the Greek for "plant," also meaning "growing being"-as a concrete entry point into the world of phusis (nature), I situate the intersecting trajectories and (crossspecies, cross-kingdoms) communities of growth at the center of environmental theory and praxis. I explore the potential of phytocentrism for the "greening" of human consciousness brought back to its vegetal roots, as well as for tackling issues related, among others, to the use of biotechnologies and dietary ethics. 1. For the most exhaustive English-language study of Klages to date, see Lebovic 2013.

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A Biocentrist Strikes Back

Cited by 46 publications

References 1 publication

The Ethics of Eliminating Harmful Species: The Case of the Tsetse Fly

The Ethics of Eliminating Harmful Species: The Case of the Tsetse Fly

The anthropocentric advantage? Environmental ethics and climate change policy

For a Phytocentrism to Come

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