A Bio-Economic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Under CAMPFIRE

Abstract

Bio-economics, Benefit sharing, CAMPFIRE, Conservation, Elephants, Hunting quotas, Poaching, Renewable resources, Wildlife, H1, Q20,

CAMPFIRE and Human-Wildlife Conflicts in Local Communities Bordering Northern Gonarezhou National Park, Zimbabwe

“…Financial difficulties led to challenges in purchasing ammunition for controlling problem animals and obtaining resources for responding to problem animals, and resulted in RDCs reducing the proportion of revenue they gave back to the CAMPFIRE communities (Mapedza 2009). The economic collapse in Zimbabwe, high inflation, and the withdrawal of the donor community following the land reforms since 2000 have been reported to have eroded the benefits that most conservation programs derive from the communal areas, given that payments of household cash dividends from CAMPFIRE revenue activities take place six months to a year after the activities have occurred (Mapedza and Bond 2006, Rihoy and Mugaranyanga 2007, Fischer et al 2011. For instance, in 1999, each household in the Mahenye community received an average earning of US$59 (Vorlaufer 2002).…”

“…CAMPFIRE has been operating in Zimbabwe since 1989, and has largely been restricted to buffer zones adjacent to national parks (Logan and Moseley 2002). CAMPFIRE programs went through a period of intense development during the 1990s and have inevitably suffered from the recent crisis in the country; however, in that first decade, there were some important signs of success but also some considerable difficulties (Fischer et al 2011). Between 1989 and 2003, the CAMPFIRE program was funded by numerous international donors, in particular, the United States Agency for International Development (Mapedza 2009).…”

Trophy Hunting, Conservation, and Rural Development in Zimbabwe: Issues, Options, and Implications

“…These areas are leased to either individual or several hunting concessions through five-year lease arrangements with ZPWMA [89]. ZPWMA generates revenue from trophy hunting through (1) trophy fees, (2) administrative fees (punching and stamping fees), and (3) fixed quotas (a predetermined, fixed number of animals expected to be harvested from a population per hunting season [90,91]). Until recently, ZPWMA has been leasing all its concessions to private operators.…”

Conservation marketing and education for less charismatic biodiversity and conservation businesses for sustainable development

“…Perhaps it is time to move beyond the strict control of budgets of protected areas by central governments in Africa and advocate for new public-privatecommunity partnerships that could help channel an important part of the revenue generated from ecotourism and trophy hunting directly to local people living on reserve borders (Jorge et al, 2013). This may also be beneficial in better marketing many protected areas in Africa, which are hardly visited by any tourist (Fischer, Muchapondwa & Sterner, 2011).…”

“…An alternative strategy may be to allow well-established and better capitalized private companies and tour operators to join forces with local communities and run conservation businesses on leased land, as such businesses are increasingly delivering financial benefits and guaranteeing employment to local communities helping achieve human and economic development (Spenceley, 2010;Fischer et al, 2011). Such joint collaborations may be particularly beneficial to support ongoing initiatives for protected area expansion for both charismatic and less charismatic biodiversity.…”