A bilevel game-theoretic decision-making framework for strategic retailers in both local and wholesale electricity markets

Hong, Qiuyi; Meng, Fanyong; Liu, Jian; Bo, Rui

doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2022.120311

Cited by 20 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…A game-theoretic approach to the optimal bidding strategy for DR aggregators in deregulated energy markets was provided (Abapour et al, 2019b). A bilevel game-theoretic model for multiple strategic retailers participating in both wholesale and local electricity markets while considering customers' switching behaviors was proposed (Hong et al, 2023).…”

Section: Response Capability Evaluation Model Of Electric Vehicle Agg...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A hierarchical extension coordinated controller was proposed, which considered the bounded rationality of the control system to address traditional stability control interference on driving speed and driver operation (Zheng et al, 2023). Considering the formation mechanism of greenwashing behaviors and collusion in EV certification processes, a tripartite evolutionary game model based on strategic interactions among manufacturers, certification authorities, and governments was constructed (Liu et al, 2023).…”

Section: Response Capability Evaluation Model Of Electric Vehicle Agg...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Response capability evaluation model of electric vehicle aggregator based on evolutionary game and response anticipation

Xu,

Mi,

Zhan

et al. 2023

Front. Energy Res.

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Accurately quantitative evaluation of the response capability of electric vehicle aggregator (EVA), i.e., the adjustable range of power, is the premise and basis of its participation in the demand response (DR). In response to the current EVA’s response capability evaluation, ignoring the autonomy of EV decision-making behavior may lead to overly idealized evaluation results, as well as the problem of evaluating only from a single time scale. To this end, this paper proposes a response capability evaluation model of EVA based on evolutionary game and response anticipation. Based on the physical constraints of EVs and their willingness to discharge, response capability evaluation models are constructed for individual EVs of different response types. Considering the autonomy of decision-making behavior of EVs, an evolutionary game model with multi-strategy sets of EVs is constructed. Based on the idea of response anticipation, a regulation strategy is proposed for EVA to achieve the dynamic update of EVA’s response capability. The proposed model is verified to be able to accurately evaluate the EVA’s response capability through simulation examples, and the EVA response capability evaluation is extended from a single time scale to multiple time scales. The evaluation results can be used as the basis for EVA to participate in the electricity market bidding.

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Section: Response Capability Evaluation Model Of Electric Vehicle Agg...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Response Capability Evaluation Model Of Electric Vehicle Agg...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Response capability evaluation model of electric vehicle aggregator based on evolutionary game and response anticipation

Xu,

Mi,

Zhan

et al. 2023

Front. Energy Res.

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“…Constraint (19) ensures that the cleared power is restricted with the offering power. In addition, the bound for the voltage angle and the fixed reference voltage angle are given in ( 20) and (21).…”

Section: B the Bi-level Model For Decision-making Of The Wppmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some works have devised market clearing algorithms in which the uncertain deviations are addressed by procuring storage devices [19] and [20]; nevertheless, their balancing strategies involve additional costs due to the beforehand purchase of reserve capacity for the DA process. A local power exchange market is also developed for retailers to facilitate power balancing [21]. Utilizing storage systems to tackle undesired deviations via the ancillary service market is an effective way, however, installing storage systems does not always bring benefits because of their high investment costs [22].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementing a Flexible Penalizing Mechanism for Wind Power Producers in the Regulating Market

Rashidizadeh-Kermani,

Vahedipour-Dahraie,

Parente

et al. 2023

IEEE Access

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The balancing market as a significant part of the spot market addresses fair transaction settlements to eliminate the system imbalances in real time. However, traditional penalty mechanisms that have been also adopted for renewable generators may incur unintended consequences for such intermittent producers and even drive them out of the market. Therefore, here a flexible penalty mechanism (FPM) is adopted instead of the traditional policies to decrease the undesired impacts of traditional penalty mechanism (TPM) on the WPP's revenue. Aligning with the FPM, making a contract between the WPP and the insurance provider in which the system operator (SO) is in charge of system balance is proposed as a remedy instrument to control the risks of wind volatilities. The proposed framework is formulated as a bi-level trilateral problem, in which in the upper level, the WPP maximizes its expected profit and in the lower level, the SO determines the market clearing prices (MCP) and maximizes the social welfare. Due to the importance of forecasting wind power generation, three deep learning algorithms are also used. Simulation results show that by applying FPM, the WPP's profit improves depending on the contract it signed with the insurance provider while the SO preserves social welfare. INDEX TERMS Electricity market, market clearing price (MCP), flexible penalty mechanism (FPM), wind power producer (WPP). NOMENCLATURE AbbreviationsDay-ahead DA Distributed energy resourceThis article has been accepted for publication in IEEE Access.

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“…Consumers may choose the best tariff according to their load profiles [5,6]. Suppliers shall study consumers' behavior and propose attractive tariffs to persuade them to join their portfolios [6][7][8]. The switching behavior of consumers increases retail competition and reduces tariffs [8,9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Behavior of Competitive Local Citizen Energy Communities in Liberalized Electricity Markets

Algarvio,

Couto,

Lopes

et al. 2024

Energies

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The liberalization of energy retail markets empowered consumers with the ability to be part of new emerging entities, such as Citizen Energy Communities. With the increasing penetration of decentralized variable generation, communities have the advantage of incentive local carbon neutrality and sustainability. Local generation reduces transport grid usage and costs to consumers. Furthermore, worldwide legislation incentives energy communities by providing them discounts to other fee parts of the tariff apart from wholesale prices. This paper presents a model of strategic behavior, investment, and trading of energy communities. The model comprises the investment in local renewable generation, the design of competitive tariffs, and strategic bidding on wholesale markets. Consumers have an optimization model that selects the retail tariff that minimizes their costs with energy. These models are tested using data from Portuguese consumers and the Iberian electricity market. Results from the study indicate that inflexible consumers may reduce their costs by 29% by being part of the community. Furthermore, they have the potential to reduce their costs above 50% when using demand–response, adapting themselves to local production and wholesale prices.

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A bilevel game-theoretic decision-making framework for strategic retailers in both local and wholesale electricity markets

Cited by 20 publications

References 47 publications

Response capability evaluation model of electric vehicle aggregator based on evolutionary game and response anticipation

Response capability evaluation model of electric vehicle aggregator based on evolutionary game and response anticipation

Implementing a Flexible Penalizing Mechanism for Wind Power Producers in the Regulating Market

Strategic Behavior of Competitive Local Citizen Energy Communities in Liberalized Electricity Markets

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