A behavioral Analysis of Concepts: Its Application to Pigeons and Children

Wasserman, Edward A.; Astley, Suzette L.

doi:10.1016/s0079-7421(08)60409-0

Cited by 39 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…The results indicated that such transfer was based mostly on the perceptual similarity of the training and the test stimuli (cf. Wasserman & Astley, 1994). The present findings are consistent with the exemplar model (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978).…”

Section: Full Rsupporting

confidence: 91%

Domestic pigeons (Columba livia) discriminate between photographs of male and female pigeons

Nakamura

Ito

Croft

et al. 2006

Learning & Behavior

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Section: Full Rsupporting

confidence: 91%

Domestic pigeons (Columba livia) discriminate between photographs of male and female pigeons

Nakamura

Ito

Croft

et al. 2006

Learning & Behavior

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“…A second associationist view that does not require a mediating mental representation argues that vervet monkeys judge, for example, wrrs and chutters to be similar not because they activate the same mental representation but because they have, in the past, been associated with the same context and response (e.g., Wasserman & Astley, 1994). Testing between these two hypotheses is difficult, and we have no data that allow us to choose definitively between them.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…In some species, loud long-distance calls may also serve as conditional recruitment signals that attract others to food. For instance, foraging subgroups ofspider monkeys, Ateles geoffroyi (Chapman & Levebre, 1990), and chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes (Clark & Wrangham, 1994;Wrangham, 1977), frequently give loud calls upon arriving at food resources. Typically, more calls are given at large food patches than at small ones.…”

Section: Baboon Contact Barksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioral mechanisms underlying vocal communication in nonhuman primates

Seyfarth

Cheney

1997

Animal Learning & Behavior

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In the wild, nonhuman primate vocalizations signal the presence of different predators, provide information about the group's location and movement, facilitate friendly interactions, and lead to reconciliation between individuals who have recently exchanged aggression. Current research examines the mechanisms that underlie such communication. Playback experiments demonstrate that subjects treat vocalizations as semantic signals, in the sense that they compare signals according to their referents and not just their acoustic properties. Results provide no evidence, however, that subjects recognize one another's mental states. Calls that provide information about the group's location or movement are given by baboons only when they themselves are lost; individuals at the group's center apparently do not call to inform peripheral animals of their location. Calls that lead to reconciliation are best explained by assuming that callers and recipients have learned, through experience, that a vocalization is rarely followed by aggression and often followed by friendly behavior. The inability of animals to recognize what other individuals know, believe, or desire constitutes a fundamental difference between nonhuman primate vocal communication and human language.

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“…Associative processes likely play an important role in categorization and stimulus class formation by both animals and people (e.g., Astley & Wasserman, 1996;Mackintosh, 1995;Wasserman, DeVolder, & Coppage, 1992;Wasserman & DeVolder, 1993;Wasserman & Astley, 1994;Zentall & Smeets, 1996).…”

Section: Resemblance By Relation or By Association?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Categorical Perception and Conceptual Judgments by Nonhuman Primates: The Paleological Monkey and the Analogical Ape

Thompson

Oden²

2000

Cognitive Science

212

166

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Studies of the conceptual abilities of nonhuman primates demonstrate the substantial range of these abilities as well as their limitations. Such abilities range from categorization on the basis of shared physical attributes, associative relations and functions to abstract concepts as reflected in analogical reasoning about relations between relations. The pattern of results from these studies point to a fundamental distinction between monkeys and apes in both their implicit and explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys, but not apes, might be best regarded as "paleo-logicans" in the sense that they form common class concepts of identity on the basis of identical predicates (i.e., shared features). The discrimination of presumably more abstract relations commonly involves relatively simple procedural strategies mediated by associative processes likely shared by all mammals. There is no evidence that monkeys can perceive, let alone judge, relations-between-relations. This analogical conceptual capacity is found only in chimpanzees and humans. Interestingly, the "analogical ape," like the child, can make its analogical knowledge explicit only if it is first provided with a symbol system by which propositional representations can be encoded and manipulated

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A behavioral Analysis of Concepts: Its Application to Pigeons and Children

Cited by 39 publications

References 40 publications

Domestic pigeons (Columba livia) discriminate between photographs of male and female pigeons

Domestic pigeons (Columba livia) discriminate between photographs of male and female pigeons

Behavioral mechanisms underlying vocal communication in nonhuman primates

Categorical Perception and Conceptual Judgments by Nonhuman Primates: The Paleological Monkey and the Analogical Ape

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