A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium

Peck, James

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.004

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Almost Ex Post Efficiency1

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Cited by 7 publications

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“…12 And, except for the presence of ω N , this definition coincides with the definitions in McLean and Postlewaite [8] and in Gul and Postlewaite [6].…”

Section: Almost Ex Post Efficiencysupporting

confidence: 63%

Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game

Wallace

2016

Journal of Economic Theory

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General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. AbstractA three-stage market-game mechanism is devised that is simple (actions are quantities and outcomes are determined by arithmetic operations that do not depend on details of the economy) and achieves efficiency in a two-divisible-good, pure-exchange setting with potential information-aggregation. After an entry stage, agents make offers which are provisional for all but a small, randomly selected group. Then, those offers are announced, and everyone else makes new offers with payoffs determined by a Shapley-Shubik market game. For a finite and large number of players, there exists an almost ex post efficient equilibrium. Conditions for uniqueness are also provided. (98 words)

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“…12 And, except for the presence of ω N , this definition coincides with the definitions in McLean and Postlewaite [8] and in Gul and Postlewaite [6].…”

Section: Almost Ex Post Efficiencysupporting

confidence: 63%