In 1946, in the Southern Urals, construction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics first plutonium plant fell to the GULAG-Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD). The chief officers in charge of the program -Lavrentii Beria, Sergei Kruglov, and Ivan Tkachenko -had been pivotal figures in the deportation and political and ethnic cleansing of territories retaken from Axis forces during WWII. These men were charged with building a nuclear weapons complex to defend the Soviet Union from the American nuclear monopoly. In part thanks to the criminalization and deportation of ethnic minorities, Gulag territories grew crowded with foreign nationals and ethnic minorities in the postwar years. The NKVD generals were appalled to find that masses of forced laborers employed at the plutonium construction site were members of enemy nations. Beria issued orders to cleanse the ranks of foreign enemies, but construction managers could not spare a single healthy body as they raced to complete their deadlines. To solve this problem, they created two zones: an interior, affluent zone for plutonium workers made up almost exclusively of Russians; and anterior zones of prisoners, soldiers, ex-cons, and local farmers, many of whom were non-Russian. The selective quality of Soviet "nuclearity" meant that many people who were exposed to the plant's secret plutonium disasters were ethnic minorities, people whose exposures went unrecorded or under-recorded because of their invisibility and low social value.In 1947, Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD) generals broke ground on a new kind of Soviet city, a gated community in the southern Urals for specially selected workers dedicated to making plutonium for atomic bombs. Surrounded by a double-walled fence, topped by razor wire and patrolled by guards, Base Ten, later known as Cheliabinsk-40, then Cheliabinsk-65, and today called Ozersk, was one of the first and the largest closed nuclear cities in the Soviet Union. It serves as an interesting case study to determine how Soviet security officials correlated nationality with national security. It comes as no surprise that NKVD and later Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (MVD) generals equated Russian and sometimes Ukrainian ethnicity with loyalty, while implicitly mistrusting citizens who had identities that could connect them with nations outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This kind of fear of cross-border alliances has been well documented (Iwanow