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Following Russell, philosophers like Moltmann, Jubien, Boër, and Newman analyse 'John believes that Mary is French' as 'R (John, the property of being French, Mary)', instead of analysing it as 'R (John, that Mary is French)'. Thus, for these philosophers, instead of relations holding between agents and truth-bearing entities (propositions), propositional attitude verbs, like 'belief', express relations holding between agents and the properties and objects our thoughts and speech acts are about. This is also known as the Multiple Relation Theory. In this paper, I will discuss the Multiple Relation Theory primarily in connection with a problem known as Schiffer's puzzle. Schiffer first presented the puzzle to argue against the so called direct-reference theory of belief reports advocated, among others, by Salmon and Braun. I will argue that, unlike the direct-reference theory of belief reports, the Multiple Relation Theory does not provide a solution to Schiffer's puzzle. In this connection, I will also discuss a slight modification of the Multiple Relation Theory according to which the ways the properties and objects our thoughts and speech acts are about are presented to us are part of the truth-conditions of sentences like 'John believes that Mary is French'. We will see that prima facie such a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory provides a solution to Schiffer's puzzle. However, concluding, I will argue with new Schiffer cases that, ultimately, also a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory cannot explain all instances of Schiffer's puzzle. This will undermine the Multiple Relation Theory in general.
Following Russell, philosophers like Moltmann, Jubien, Boër, and Newman analyse 'John believes that Mary is French' as 'R (John, the property of being French, Mary)', instead of analysing it as 'R (John, that Mary is French)'. Thus, for these philosophers, instead of relations holding between agents and truth-bearing entities (propositions), propositional attitude verbs, like 'belief', express relations holding between agents and the properties and objects our thoughts and speech acts are about. This is also known as the Multiple Relation Theory. In this paper, I will discuss the Multiple Relation Theory primarily in connection with a problem known as Schiffer's puzzle. Schiffer first presented the puzzle to argue against the so called direct-reference theory of belief reports advocated, among others, by Salmon and Braun. I will argue that, unlike the direct-reference theory of belief reports, the Multiple Relation Theory does not provide a solution to Schiffer's puzzle. In this connection, I will also discuss a slight modification of the Multiple Relation Theory according to which the ways the properties and objects our thoughts and speech acts are about are presented to us are part of the truth-conditions of sentences like 'John believes that Mary is French'. We will see that prima facie such a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory provides a solution to Schiffer's puzzle. However, concluding, I will argue with new Schiffer cases that, ultimately, also a contextualist version of the Multiple Relation Theory cannot explain all instances of Schiffer's puzzle. This will undermine the Multiple Relation Theory in general.
The book considers Bertrand Russell’s work in logic, mainly from 1900 to 1910, and his work in epistemology and metaphysics, mainly from 1910 to 1924. The part on logic includes a discussion of his seminal article ‘On Denoting’ (1905), but is mainly concerned with the development of his simple and his ramified theory of types, which culminated in Principia Mathematica of 1910. The merits and drawbacks of these theories are noted. The parts on epistemology and metaphysics begin with his ‘principle of acquaintance’, which is supposed to explain our understanding of propositions, but is open to many objections. They continue with his account of what knowledge is, and with his ‘constructions’ of material objects and of minds, which aim to conform to what (according to him) can be known. They then discuss his changing views on propositions, and his largely tacit views on universals, before ending with an account of his ‘logically perfect’ language, and his claim that its structure mirrors the structure of the world
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