Untitled

Rhoads, Thomas A.; Shogren, Jason F.

doi:10.1023/a:1023900131352

Cited by 17 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The chance to win is represented by the number of lottery tickets earned at the end of the negotiation. Since subjects negotiate over the lottery tickets and not the actual cash prize, we are able to control for heterogeneous utilities and risk preferences [33]. This setup also allows utility to be exactly equal to the probability of winning the final cash prize [33,34].…”

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since subjects negotiate over the lottery tickets and not the actual cash prize, we are able to control for heterogeneous utilities and risk preferences [33]. This setup also allows utility to be exactly equal to the probability of winning the final cash prize [33,34]. We use a context specific experiment to allow the use of language to be richer than many other non-contextual economic experiments.…”

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Language effects on bargaining

et al. 2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Language is critical to coordination in groups. Though, how language affects coordination in groups is not well understood. We prime distributive and integrative language in a bargaining experiment to better understand the links between group outcomes and communication. We accomplish this by priming interests or positions language in randomized groups. We find that priming positions as opposed to interests language leads to agreements where controllers, subjects with unilateral authority over the group outcome, receive a larger share of the benefits but where the total benefits to the group are unaffected. In contrast to common justifications for the use of integrative language in bargaining, our experimental approach revealed no significant differences between priming interests and positions language in regards to increasing joint outcomes for the groups. Across treatments, we find subjects that use gain frames and make reference to visuals aids during bargaining experience larger gains for the group, while loss frames and pro-self language experience larger gains for the individual through side payments. This finding suggests a bargainer's dilemma: whether to employ language that claims a larger share of group's assets or employ language to increase joint gains.

show abstract

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Language effects on bargaining

et al. 2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

Cherry

2005

Environ Resource Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining. Copyright Springer 2005bargaining, Coase theorem, property rights, valuation, C9, Q0,

show abstract

Negotiation versus consultation in the development of a regulation

Calcott

2007

Environ Resource Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Untitled

Cited by 17 publications

References 23 publications

Language effects on bargaining

Language effects on bargaining

Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

Negotiation versus consultation in the development of a regulation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About