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Selinger, Evan; Crease, Robert P

doi:10.1023/a:1022643708111

Cited by 36 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Expertise has been described as`the pressing intellectual problem of the age' 19 and as central to many aspects of contemporary life. 20 As Roberts and Zuckerman explain, debate about the proper place of experts is marked by an enduring tension between juror education and juror deference, 21 in other words, whether experts are primarily educating juries about complex matters, or directing 500 them to a particular conclusion. And generally speaking, claims of expertise sit somewhat awkwardly within a democracy, with dangers of elitism, ideology, and bias masquerading as neutral, objective expertise.…”

Section: Experts and Expert Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Expert Evidence and Medical Manslaughter: Vagueness in Action

Quick¹

2011

Journal of Law and Society

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This article examines the reliance placed on expert evidence in prosecutions of health professionals for gross negligence manslaughter, where juries must decide whether conduct goes beyond civil negligence and constitutes the crime of involuntary manslaughter. It argues that the test for liability is vague and examines some of the consequences of this. Given the vagueness of the offence, jurors are likely to place great reliance on expert medical evidence. Little is known about how experts negotiate the legal process, empirically speaking: how they approach their task, how they view their role as expert witnesses, and the attitudes, biases, and beliefs that may underpin their testimony. Drawing on the experiences and perceptions often medical experts, this article explores how experts manage the vagueness inherent in the task of interpreting and applying gross negligence. Experts appear to go beyond offering purely medical opinion and enjoy engaging with law and the legal process.

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Section: Experts and Expert Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Expert Evidence and Medical Manslaughter: Vagueness in Action

Quick¹

2011

Journal of Law and Society

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“…Que signifie le fait de posséder un savoir d'expert ? Plusieurs auteurs soulignent que les questions épistémologiques sur la nature du savoir expert sont pertinentes quant il s'agit de traiter le problème de l'intentionnalité, les notions rationalistes et représentationnelles de la conscience, et le thème de l'intersubjectivité (Pappas 1994 ;Selinger et Crease 2002). Ces questions sont aussi directement rattachées à la possibilité de l'intelligence artificielle et de la création de systèmes experts.…”

Section: Le Débat Sur L'expertiseunclassified

“…Lenat, abordant la question sous l'angle de la philosophie classique des sciences (Selinger et Crease 2002), considère que l'expertise peut se réduire à des règles rationnelles (informatiques) et à un savoir propositionnel. En tant que telle, l'expertise peut être reconstruite rationnellement comme un phénomène qui est d'abord d'ordre mental intellectuel.…”

Section: Le Débat Sur L'expertiseunclassified

“…Cette approche rend bien compte des limites externes que les facteurs culturels imposent à l'expertise et elle dit beaucoup sur les facteurs sociaux et politiques qui limitent les processus incarnés ; cependant, en elle-même, elle ne fournit aucune explication positive sur la manière dont l'expertise se développe, si ce n'est en ajoutant ces limitations externes à l'explication proposée par Dreyfus. De plus, Selinger et Crease (2002) signalent que Dreyfus a bien une place pour l'idée que les « styles culturels » affectent la manière dont les savoirfaire sont appris (Dreyfus 2000), mais que cette notion n'est tout simplement pas développée :…”

Section: Le Débat Sur L'expertiseunclassified

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Les conditions de corporéité et d’intersubjectivité chez la personne morale

Gallagher¹,

Mansour-Robaey²

2004

Théologiques

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“…Though many of the details in the philosophical literature are still being debated, I am relying here here on minimal claims about the nature of implicit knowledge and skill, which are generally accepted. The locus classicus for modern discussions of skill is inDreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) Selinger and Crease (2002). offer a useful criticism of the Dreyfusian approach, pointing out that they fail to account for the possibility of expert bias.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Transparency is Surveillance

Nguyen

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O'Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency -that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to nonexperts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption -but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual's capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust -if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public -then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise.In her 2002 BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O'Neill offers a biting criticism of one of the ethical presumptions of modern life. People think that trust and transparency go together, says O'Neill. And they think that transparency is wholly good. But actually, she says, trust and transparency are deeply opposed.

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Cited by 36 publications

References 32 publications

Expert Evidence and Medical Manslaughter: Vagueness in Action

Expert Evidence and Medical Manslaughter: Vagueness in Action

Les conditions de corporéité et d’intersubjectivité chez la personne morale

Transparency is Surveillance

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