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Negative stereotypes as motivated justifications for moral exclusion

“…Crawford, Brandt, Inbar, & Mallinas, 2016;Newman, Hartman, & Taber, 2012;Rios, 2013;Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005). This finding does not regularly appear in experimental studies in which the perception of the outgroups is manipulated more subtly by describing the group as either threatening the ingroup's values or its status (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014;Dru, 2007;Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b;Thomsen et al, 2008). From these results, it seems that people with high SDO are not sensitive to the subtle cues of value-threats but perceived threat can increase when they are presented explicitly.…”

“…Nevertheless, these stereotypes still provide justifications for moral exclusion and negative treatment related to the frustrated motivations, but in this case the subjective power of this sort of justification is not exclusive. This assumption is supported by the fact that although people with a high level of SDO do not seem to be sensitive to the more subtle cues for symbolic threats manipulated experimentally (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014;Dru, 2007;Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b;Thomsen et al, 2008), they tend to agree with explicit beliefs describing these threats (Crawford et al, 2016;Newman et al, 2012;Rios, 2013;Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005).…”

“…Groups can also be perceived as threatening both motivational goals. In these cases RWA and SDO predict whether the security-related or the status-related threat is more relevant for the perceiver (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014;Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b;Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). However, evidence from survey research suggests that even after controlling for the effect of RWA, SDO still correlates with the explicit belief that the outgroup threatens the conventions and values of the ingroup (e.g.…”