1998
DOI: 10.1023/a:1009692703952
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Untitled

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

1
12
0

Year Published

2000
2000
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
7
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 83 publications
(13 citation statements)
references
References 19 publications
1
12
0
Order By: Relevance
“…In order to test if the results are sensitive to the measure of earnings management we used, we also estimate discretionary accruals using two variations of the original Jones Model: i) the modified Jones Model (De Fuentes & Porcuna, 2019;Dechow et al, 1995;Paiva et al, 2019) and ii) the short-term Jones Model (Beneish, 1998;Teoh et al, 1998). The results for Model (1) and Model (2) are reported in Tables 7 and 8, respectively, and are qualitatively similar to those reported in the main analysis.…”
Section: Alternative Measures Of Earnings Managementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order to test if the results are sensitive to the measure of earnings management we used, we also estimate discretionary accruals using two variations of the original Jones Model: i) the modified Jones Model (De Fuentes & Porcuna, 2019;Dechow et al, 1995;Paiva et al, 2019) and ii) the short-term Jones Model (Beneish, 1998;Teoh et al, 1998). The results for Model (1) and Model (2) are reported in Tables 7 and 8, respectively, and are qualitatively similar to those reported in the main analysis.…”
Section: Alternative Measures Of Earnings Managementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Despite the statistical and economic significance of the above studies, many academics contest such conclusions. Beneish [65] doubts the possibility of systematically inflating earnings without arousing the suspicions of regulators or shareholders. Ball and Shivakumar [66,67] argue that IPO firms should be induced to report more conservatively, because of the higher reporting standards demanded for public companies, better monitoring by boards and analysts, or penalties for misreporting.…”
Section: Earnings Quality Around Going Public: the Existing Evidencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…7 2.2.2 | Probability of manipulation Although overvalued firms have weak fundamental performance, Jensen (2005) suggests that these firms overstate their performance through earnings manipulation. We rely on Beneish (1999) to measure the probability of earnings overstatement. The Beneish (1999) model is appropriate for studying the relation between fraudulent earnings overstatement and equity overvaluation for two reasons.…”
Section: Fundamental Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our model is a scoring system that combines firm characteristics into an overvaluation score (OVR-Score) ranging from 0-5. Firms receive one point for having a high likelihood of earnings overstatement (based on the Beneish's (1999) M-Score measure), high sales growth, low operating cash flows to total assets, an acquisition in the last 5 years, and unusual amounts of equity issuance in the past 2 years. 3 Thus, firms with glamour characteristics, poor current operating cash flow performance, a high likelihood of earnings overstatement, a history of merger activity, and recent but excessive issuances of stock fit our profile of overvalued equity.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%