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The limits of conceivability: logical cognitivism and the language faculty

“…Fodor's central claim here is that if content is do the work that cognitive science would have it do, then we must be able to understand it as being causally efficacious 8 I have no complaint here against the kind of view articulated and defended by Rey (1998), who imagines an innate logic machine, modelled on a Gentzen-style natural deduction system. Rey's very point is that such a machine would naturalistically explain at least one area of our a priori knowledge.…”

“…See, e.g.,Rey (1998);Ludlow (2002), andCrain and Khlentzos (2008) for ideas on the innateness of logic. It is crucial to note, however, that the algebraic properties we expect adequate formal systems to represent are not reflected as constraints in the inferential/reasoning performance of normal subjects (see, e.g.,Stein 1996; Kahneman and Tversky 2000); indeed, it is presently unclear if logic even captures our common notion of 'good reasoning' (see, e.g., Harman 1986; Cherniak 1986; among many others).…”