602 and One Dead: On Contribution to Global Poverty and Liability to Defensive Force

Abstract

When suggesting that we—the affluent in the developed world—are legitimate targets of defensive force due to our contribution to global poverty one is likely to be countered by one of two strategies. The first denies that we contribute to global poverty. The second seems to affirm that we contribute, and even that we have stringent contribution‐based duties to address this poverty, but denies that such contribution makes forcible resistance permissible. Those in this second group employ several argumentative strategies. In this paper I investigate these strategies for denying the force‐related implication of contribution to poverty. I do not argue for political violence or for the permissibility of targeting the affluent, I merely investigate a conditional: if contribution to global poverty generates stringent duties to address it, then this contribution implies permission on the part of the victims to defend themselves with force, or for third parties to use force on their behalf.

Pogge, poverty, and war

“…Finally, the third response to Räikkä’s criticism denies that liability implies culpability (cf. Øverland, 2011: 289). This response has considerable force for reasons offered by Jeff McMahan.…”

“…First, appealing to Barry and Øverland to resist the conclusions of my three analogy arguments comes at a very high price to those who are attracted to Pogge’s analysis of global poverty; for its core claim to being interesting is its contention that rich people violate the negative rights of poor people in ways that, morally speaking, are tantamount to doing harm (cf. Øverland, 2011: 280). 18 Endorsing the Barry and Øverland analysis implies giving up on this claim and, thus, rejecting Pogge’s basis for moral condemnation of how rich people’s treatment of the global poor is seriously, morally wrong.…”

“…Premise 2 can be resisted on other grounds as well. For instance, one might think that the contribution of most citizens supporting their government’s military or economic aggression is too insignificant, causally speaking, to render them liable to attack (McMahan, 2009: 225, 231; but see Lippert-Rasmussen, 2013b, 38–40; Øverland, 2011: 285–288). In this view, some civilians, whose contribution to the relevant aggression is significant, for example, leading decision makers or key personnel working in the armaments industry, may be liable to attack, while some non-civilians are not so liable, because their contribution to the relevant aggression is no more significant than that of most civilians, for example, military personnel based on a remote island that cannot be moved to the conflict zone during the time in which the armed confrontation takes place.…”

Just War Theory: Revisionists Versus Traditionalists

“…Caney (2005) concluded that military intervention is permissible just in case it improves the net satisfaction of basic human rights. Others defended, at least in principle, "redistributive" wars, fought against the global rich to redress the suffering of the global poor (Luban 1980b, Fabre 2012, Lippert-Rasmussen 2013, Øverland 2013.…”

Redistributive wars

“…Nonetheless, some philosophers have recently tried to defend redistributive wars. According to Gerhard Øverland, Cécile Fabre, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen and Gwilym David Blunt, violating duties of global justice can be a just cause for war (Luban, 1980;Øverland, 2011;Fabre, 2012;Lippert-Rasmussen, 2013Barry & Øverland, 2016). They defend the controversial claim that, under certain circumstances and as an ultimum remedium, the global poor can be justified in waging a redistributive war against the global rich.…”